REGULATORY APPROACHES TO THE INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLE AND STORAGE RESOURCES INTO ELECTRICITY MARKETS by Munoz Alvarez, Daniel
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO THE
INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLE AND STORAGE
RESOURCES INTO ELECTRICITY MARKETS
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Daniel Mun˜oz A´lvarez
May 2017
c© 2017 Daniel Mun˜oz A´lvarez
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO THE INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLE
AND STORAGE RESOURCES INTO ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Daniel Mun˜oz A´lvarez, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2017
This dissertation describes regulatory approaches that encourage the efficient in-
tegration and participation of storage and distributed energy resources (DERs) in
electricity markets. In particular, it aims to mitigate barriers to the entry and
realization of the full value of these technologies with two approaches.
A first approach comprises a mechanism for the participation of storage re-
sources in the wholesale market. The mechanism delineates a regulatory framework
aimed (i) to diversify the alternatives to monetize the value of storage resources
through wholesale markets and (ii) to enlarge storage owners opportunities to
monetize the value of their assets regardless of their merchant or regulated nature.
Essential to this participation mechanism —an open access approach to the inte-
gration of storage— is the centralized operation of the participating assets and the
use of tradable electricity derivatives, referred to as financial storage rights (FSRs),
to remunerate the energy arbitrage service provided by the assets. This remuner-
ation scheme ensures the revenue adequacy of the independent system operator
—by means of a generalized simultaneous feasibility test— and brings additional
value to market participants. In particular, FSRs allow market participants to
hedge intertemporal price risk (i.e., profile risk) and to monetize intertemporal
flexibility capabilities for improving the intraday load profile.
The second approach addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for dis-
tribution systems with distributed energy resources (DERs) such as renewable
distributed generation and energy storage. This analysis aims to shed lights
on the impact of tariff structure —particularly dynamic pricing and connection
charges— upon social welfare and the integration of DERs. In particular, this
analysis presents a framework to optimize ex-ante two-part tariffs for a regulated
monopolistic retailer who faces stochastic wholesale prices and fixed costs on the
one hand and a stochastic demand on the other. Within this framework, the
exogenous integration of DERs is addressed by characterizing their endogenous
effect on optimal tariffs and on the induced welfare effects. Two DER integration
models are considered: a decentralized model involving behind-the-meter DERs
integrated by customers in a net metering setting, and a centralized model with
retailer-integrated DERs.
This analysis shows, one the one hand, that net metering tariffs relying on price
markups to maintain revenue adequacy —which provide strong incentives for DER
integration— entail cross-subsidies and significant consumption inefficiencies that
can outweigh the social value of DERs. On the other hand, it demonstrates that net
metering tariffs can achieve revenue adequacy without compromising social welfare
through marginal cost pricing and higher connection charges, but these undermine
the incentives to integrate distributed generation. Numerical simulations based on
empirical data are presented to illustrate and validate the analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
At the verge of a transformation driven by technological innovations, the elec-
tric power industry has a unique opportunity to evolve towards a decentralized
and decarbonized paradigm by favoring more inclusive market rules. These inno-
vations involve cost reductions in modular technologies such as photovoltaic (PV)
solar panels, electric batteries, and smart meters, making them more competitive.
In fact, due to these innovations, distributed energy resources (DER) and demand
response (DR) programs are starting to compete with more traditional genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution expansion alternatives. However, to make
the widespread adoption of these technologies possible, many entry barriers still
need to be mitigated. Many of these barriers are regulatory choices embedded in
market rules historically biased towards traditional —more centralized— expan-
sion alternatives. And, as such, they need to be transformed into more inclusive
rules that are, for instance, technology-neutral and open to alternative —more
decentralized— ownership structures that improve customers’ choices regarding
their electricity needs.
Consider, for example, the case of energy storage technologies. Many studies
and reports argue that storage resources face significant market, regulatory and
policy barriers [5,82,126,129,135,136,139]. In response, FERC has acknowledged
these barriers and has issued several rulemakings intended to alleviate some of
them starting with FERC Order No. 890 [139]1. In particular, the literature seems
to agree that the following are three crucial barriers hampering the deployment
of storage. First, the incomplete valuation of the benefits brought by storage is
1See [53, footnote 15] for a detailed list of FERC Orders.
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one of the most cited barriers [126]. Second, the restrictive regulatory treatment
of storage which typically limits the value streams that can be exploited by a
particular asset. An example is the inability of storage assets to provide both
regulated and market-based services [53,126,129]. Lastly, revenue risk also appears
to be a significant barrier, especially for merchant storage developers who —unlike
regulated utilities— are exposed to the risk of revenue insufficiency [126]. While
storage assets could also be rate based, e.g., as an asset providing transmission
services, revenue risk “can add to the difficulty of demonstrating the prudence of
a storage project” [126]. To some extent, these barriers are valid for all storage
projects regardless their intended location on the electrical system and ownership
structure.
Broadly, this thesis addresses certain barriers to the deployment of storage and
DERs with two separate proposals. On the one hand, the first proposal in Chapter
2 addresses the participation of storage resources in the wholesale market. This
proposal is indifferent to the resources’ location within the electric power network,
to its capacity and physical model, and it suits both co-located storage resources
and aggregated fleets of storage resources. However, it is naturally more appro-
priate for resources located within a single (wholesale) pricing zone and with a
collective capacity large enough for the wholesale market. In particular, the pro-
posal delineates a regulatory framework that allows storage resources to derive
revenue primarily from their temporal arbitrage capabilities regardless of whether
the resource is classified as a regulated or merchant asset. For regulated storage
assets, this framework enables the provision of a market service not allowed by
the current regulatory treatment of storage. For merchant storage assets and even
DER aggregators, the value of the framework is that it embodies a structured,
flexible and centralized market mechanism to hedge the net revenue derived from
2
temporal arbitrage. The framework appears as an alternative to participating in
the day-ahead energy market, which has been demonstrated to expose storage re-
sources to significant revenue uncertainty [126]2. The proposed framework brings
additional value by proving market participants with a centralized market for fi-
nancial instruments that are dedicated to hedge intraday temporal price differences
in a manner complementary to the hedge provided by financial transmission rights
(FTRs) against nodal price differences. This framework is compatible with the no-
tice of proposed rulemaking recently issued by FERC [53] which intends to “estab-
lish a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical
and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their
participation in the organized wholesale electric markets”. Moreover, it seeks to
“define distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant
that can participate in the organized wholesale electric markets under the partici-
pation model that best accommodates the physical and operational characteristics
of its distributed energy resource aggregation” [54].
On the other hand, the second proposal in this dissertation addresses the par-
ticipation of storage resources—and more generally of distributed energy resources
(DERs)—in the retail electricity market. The proposal —developed in Chapters 4
and 5— is intended exclusively for DERs located within the distribution network
or on-site at the end-customers’ side of the meter. As such, it is more appropriate
for DERs with an individual or aggregate capacity suitable for distribution net-
works or end-customer circuits. In particular, the proposal addresses the impact of
DER integration in the highly regulated retail electricity tariff design process. It
studies the vicious cycle that current tariff design practices—based on marked-up
retail prices and net metering arrangements—can create as end-customers start
2For example, [45, 123, 127] show that arbitrage revenues can vary by a factor of up to five
from year to year.
3
adopting DERs, such as solar photo-voltaic (PV) systems and electric batteries,
more widely. More specifically, it studies some of the negative effects of the vi-
cious cycle—namely, the economic inefficiencies caused by price markups and the
cross-subsidies given to DER-owning customers—and examines how optimally de-
signed dynamic prices and connection charges can mitigate such effects. In a
broad sense, this study argues that current tariff design practices stimulate DER
integration in an unsustainable manner that increasingly compromises short-run
economic efficiency and equity, and suggests a reasonable alternative. This pro-
posal is aligned in many ways with several recent studies intended to guide public
utility commissions—the entities regulating electricity utilities in the U.S.—but
explores specific theoretical and empirical questions that have been overlooked.
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL STORAGE RIGHTS IN ELECTRIC POWER
NETWORKS1
Daniel Mun˜oz-A´lvarez and Eilyan Bitar2
The decreasing cost of energy storage technologies coupled with their poten-
tial to bring significant benefits to electric power networks have kindled research
efforts to design both market and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the efficient
construction and operation of such technologies. In this paper, we examine an
open access approach to the integration of storage, which enables the complete
decoupling of a storage facility’s ownership structure from its physical operation.
In particular, we analyze a nodal spot pricing system built on a model of economic
dispatch in which storage is centrally dispatched by the independent system oper-
ator (ISO) to maximize social welfare. Concomitant with such an approach is the
ISO’s collection of a merchandising surplus reflecting congestion in storage. We
introduce a class of tradable electricity derivatives – referred to as financial storage
rights (FSRs) – to enable the redistribution of such rents in the form of financial
property rights to storage capacity; and establish a generalized simultaneous fea-
sibility test to ensure the ISO’s revenue adequacy when allocating such financial
property rights to market participants. Several advantages of such an approach to
open access storage are discussed. In particular, we illustrate with a stylized ex-
ample the role of FSRs in synthesizing fully hedged, fixed-price bilateral contracts
1Supported in part by NSF grant ECCS-1351621, NSF grant CNS-1239178, NSF grant CNS-
1135844, PSERC under sub-award S-52, and US DoE under the CERTS initiative. A preliminary
version of this paper was presented at the 2014 North American Power Symposium in Pullman,
WA [86].
2E. Bitar is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA. Email: eyb5@cornell.edu
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for energy, when the seller and buyer exhibit differing intertemporal supply and
demand characteristics, respectively.
2.1 Introduction
The increased penetration of supply derived from variable renewable energy re-
sources, coupled with the recent decline in the cost of electric energy storage
technologies, has brought about an opportunity to significantly reduce the cost
of managing the electric power system through careful planning, deployment, and
operation of storage resources [60]. Broadly, the short-run value of energy stor-
age derives from its ability to arbitrage energy forward in time, enabling both the
absorption of power imbalances on short time scales and the more substantial re-
shaping of supply and demand profiles over longer periods of time. The extent to
which the deployment of a collection of energy storage devices might benefit the
power system depends critically, however, on the collective sizing, placement, and
operation of said devices [16]. The challenge resides in the design and implemen-
tation of electricity markets and instruments that induce strategic expansion and
operation of storage in a manner that is consistent with the maximization of social
welfare over both the long and short run, respectively.
The coordinated optimal dispatch of a collection of distributed energy storage
resources clearly offers the possibility of a sizable reduction in the cost of servicing
demand by reshaping it in such a manner as to alleviate both transmission con-
gestion and the reliance on peak power generation [108]. Of interest then is the
characterization of mechanisms for the integration of storage, which encourage its
efficient operation. And of critical importance to this effort is the resolution of
6
the question: who commands the storage? Among the variety of possible answers
to this question, there are two extremes – differing in terms of the degree of gov-
ernment intervention – which we naturally refer to as competitive and regulated.
Each implies a distinct mechanism for both the operation of the physical storage
facilities and the remuneration of the services provided.
Broadly, the competitive or market-based operation of storage entails a decen-
tralized operating paradigm in which storage owners pursue their own rational
(profit maximizing) interests in the spot energy market. A shortcoming of such
approach to storage integration derives from the uncertainty in revenue that stor-
age owner-operators might obtain from the spot market. Energy storage is a capital
intensive technology. And several recent studies [44, 113, 126, 136] have indicated
that the risk of incomplete capital cost recovery due to such revenue uncertainty
may serve to inhibit investment in storage facilities. Sioshansi [124] also goes on to
show that a complete reliance on the spot energy market to guide the integration
of storage may lead to its substantial underutilization relative to the social opti-
mum, as strategic owner-operators of storage will naturally endeavor to preserve
intertemporal price differences for purposes of arbitrage.
The regulated operation of storage, on the other hand, calls for a centralized
operating paradigm in which storage is treated as a communal asset that is centrally
dispatched by the Independent System Operator (ISO) to maximize social welfare
subject to its physical constraints.1 The socially optimal dispatch of storage, in
concert with conventional generation and transmission, naturally improves upon
the welfare of the system in the short run. Accordingly, such an approach to the
operation of storage necessitates the creation of a mechanism capable of extracting
1The PJM Interconnection has explored a similar regulatory framework in which energy stor-
age would be operated and compensated traditionally like a transmission asset [108].
7
and redistributing the value added by storage back to the owners of the responsible
storage facilities. Towards this end, we propose a market mechanism founded on
the definition of tradable financial instruments, which monetize property rights
to storage capacity made available to the ISO for centralized operation. Such an
approach resembles the regulation and operation of transmission in the majority
of US electricity markets, which entails the centrally optimized operation of the
transmission network subject to the locational marginal pricing of energy, and the
allocation of financial transmission rights that monetize property rights to said
transmission capacity [2, 62,64,100,101].
2.1.1 Open Access Energy Storage
There has been recent activity in both academia and industry to identify alterna-
tive paradigms to support the efficient integration of storage into power system op-
erations [108,126]. One stream of literature centers on an open access approach to
the integration of storage; or more simply, open access storage (OAS) [59,126,134].
Loosely, we refer to OAS as a regulatory framework in which energy storage facil-
ities are treated as communal assets accessible by all participants in the wholesale
energy market.
To the best of our knowledge, only two concrete approaches to OAS have been
proposed. He et al. [59] proposes a market framework where storage owners sell
physically binding rights to their storage capacity through sequential auctions co-
ordinated by the ISO. The collection of physical rights, which are defined as a
sequence of nodal power injections within a specified time horizon, determine the
actual operation of the storage. As such, the physical rights associated with a
particular storage facility must be collectively feasible with respect to the corre-
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sponding physical device constraints. While such physical rights might be used
by market participants to execute price arbitrage or mitigate the cost of honoring
existing contractual energy commitments, there are several important limitations.
First, the ability of a market participant to leverage on a physical storage right
depends on her location within the network relative to the storage facilities. Such
restriction could serve to limit market access. Second, the eventual physical dis-
patch of storage is determined by a sequence of auctions – the outcome of which
is likely to substantially deviate from the socially optimal dispatch, because of
strategic interactions between parties bidding for physical storage rights.
Closer to our proposal, Taylor [134] suggests an approach to OAS that centers
on a paradigm in which storage owners sell financially binding rights to their
storage capacity through an auction coordinated by the ISO. The ISO is charged
with the task of operating storage in a socially efficient manner – not unlike its
non-discriminatory operation of the transmission network. As financial rights, they
do not interfere with the optimal operation of storage, but rather, they represent
entitlements to portions of the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO. A
central component of the proposal in [134] is the definition of the financial rights in
terms of the shadow prices associated with the physical constraints on the storage
facilities. This is analogous to the definition of flowgate rights (FGRs) [26–28] in
the context of open access transmission. And, as a result, such a definition of
financial storage rights is naturally endowed with advantages and disadvantages
comparable to those of FGRs in the context of transmission. We refer the reader
to Section 2.3.4 and [65,104] for a more detailed discussion on such issues.
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2.1.2 Contribution
We propose a regulatory framework to enable open access storage, which centers
largely on the concept of financial storage rights (FSRs). Broadly speaking, FSRs
can be interpreted as financial property rights to storage capacity; or, more accu-
rately, as financial entitlements to portions of the storage congestion rent collected
by the ISO under the socially optimal dispatch of storage capacity. Being defined
as such, FSRs enable the complete decoupling of a storage facility’s ownership from
its physical operation. Moreover, the specific form of FSRs that we propose – viz. a
sequence of nodal power injections and withdrawals that yield its holder a payment
according to the corresponding sequence of nodal spot prices – provides market
participants the ability to perfectly hedge physical or financial energy positions
against intertemporal price risk in the spot market.2 Such hedging capabilities
represent a natural complement to financial transmission rights (FTRs) and their
ability to hedge spatial price risk across the network. What distinguishes such
financial instruments from standard forward energy contracts is the fact that they
are issued under the physical cover of transmission and storage capacity, and are
settled against the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO. Accordingly, in
Section 2.3.5, we establish a generalized simultaneous feasibility test (SFT), which
constrains the joint allocation of financial transmission and storage rights in such a
manner as to guarantee the ISO’s revenue adequacy. Namely, any simultaneously
feasible collection of transmission and storage rights are guaranteed to yield a rent
that does not exceed the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO. A positive
attribute of the proposed SFT is that it enables the allocation (auction) of FSRs at
nodes without physical storage capacity – a feature which genuinely democratizes
2Such a definition of FSRs represents a financial analog to the physical storage rights proposed
by He et al. [59], and is in contrast to the constraint-based financial rights proposed in [134].
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access to storage by all market participants.
2.1.3 Organization
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we formulate the
multi-period economic dispatch problem with storage, and delineate its optimality
conditions. In Section 2.3, we formally introduce the concept of financial storage
rights, and establish a general test for simultaneous feasibility, which restricts the
allocation of both financial transmission and storage rights in such a manner as
to ensure the ISO’s revenue adequacy. In Section 2.4, we illustrate with a stylized
example the role of FSRs in synthesizing flexible, fully hedged, fixed-price bilateral
contracts for energy. We close with a discussion on directions for future research in
Section 2.5. All mathematical proofs are included in the Appendix to the paper.
2.2 Models and Formulation
2.2.1 Notation
Let R denote the set of real numbers and R+ the non-negative real numbers.
Denote the transpose of a vector x ∈ Rn by x>. Let xi denote the ith entry of
a vector x ∈ Rn. We define by 1 a column vector of all ones and by ei the ith
standard basis vector of dimension appropriate to the context. For two matrices
A,B ∈ Rm×n of equivalent dimension, we denote their Hadamard product by A◦B.
Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, we write A = 0 to denote entrywise equivalence to zero.
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2.2.2 Network Model
Consider a transmission network defined on a set of n nodes (buses) connected
by m edges (transmission lines). The associated graph of the network is assumed
connected. The nodes are indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We operate under the
assumption of a linear model of steady state power flow defined by the so called DC
power flow approximation, where the vector of nodal power injections is linearly
mapped to a vector of (directional) power flows along the m transmission lines
through the mapping H ∈ R2m×n, commonly referred to as the shift-factor matrix.
Let c ∈ R2m+ denote the corresponding vector of transmission line capacities. It
follows that the set of feasible power injections is described by the polytope P(c) ⊂
Rn,
P(c) = {v ∈ Rn ∣∣ Hv ≤ c, 1>v = 0} . (2.1)
One can readily verify the compactness of P(c), as rank(H) = n − 1 and 1> is
linearly independent from the rows of H.
2.2.3 Cost Model
At the core of the formulation considered in this paper is the problem of multi-
period economic dispatch over N discrete time periods, which we index by k =
0, . . . , N−1. We measure the cost and benefit of the net injection vector v(k) ∈ Rn
at time k according to
C(v(k), k) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(vi(k), k),
Each component function Ci(v, k) is assumed to be increasing, convex, and differ-
entiable in v over R. Moreover, each function is assumed to satisfy Ci(0, k) = 0,
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Ci(v, k) > 0 for v > 0, and Ci(v, k) < 0 for v < 0. This implies that Ci(v, k) rep-
resents the convex cost of generation for v > 0 at node i and time k. Conversely,
−Ci(v, k) represents the concave benefit of consumption for v < 0 at node i and
time k. Finally, the component functions {Ci(·, k)} to allowed to vary with time
in order to capture the potential variation in the nodal demand preferences over
time. We refer the reader to Wu et al. [142] for a more detailed explanation of this
model.
2.2.4 Energy Storage Model
We consider an arbitrary collection of n perfectly efficient energy storage devices
connected to the transmission network, where we associate with each node i a
storage device with energy capacity bi ∈ R+. We denote by b =
[
b1, . . . , bn
]>
the vector of nodal energy storage capacities. The collective storage dynamics are
naturally modeled as a linear difference equation
z(k + 1) = z(k)− u(k) (2.2)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where the vector z(k) ∈ Rn+ denotes the vector of energy
storage states just preceding time period k, and the input u(k) ∈ Rn denotes the
vector of net energy storage extractions during period k. The notational convention
is such that ui(k) > 0 (resp. ui(k) < 0) represents a net energy extraction from
(resp. injection into) the storage device at node i during time period k. Without
loss of generality, we assume an initial condition of z(0) = 0 for the remainder
of the paper. The limited capacities of the energy storage devices require that
0 ≤ z(k) ≤ b for all k. Iterating the linear difference equation (2.2) back to its
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initial condition, one can express the storage capacity constraint as
0 ≤ −
k−1∑
`=0
u(`) ≤ b (2.3)
for k = 1, . . . , N . As a matter of notational convenience, we consider an equivalent
characterization of the energy storage capacity constraints (2.3), which enables
a decomposition of the constraints across nodes. More specifically, letting ui =[
ui(0), . . . , ui(N − 1)
]>
denote the entire sequence of injections and extractions
from the storage device at node i, one can recast the constraints defined by (2.3)
as
ui ∈ U(bi) =
{
u ∈ RN ∣∣ 0 ≤ Lu ≤ bi} (2.4)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Here, L ∈ RN×N denotes a lower triangular matrix with entries
[L]k` = −1 for all k ≥ `, and zero otherwise. We also define bi =
[
bi, . . . , bi
]>
∈ Rn.
It is immediate to see that U(bi) is a compact polytope containing the origin for
each i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.2.1 While the model of storage considered is stylized in nature, much of
the ensuing analysis and conclusions derived can be easily extended to accommodate
nonidealities in storage, such as constraints on allowable rates of charging and
discharging, roundtrip inefficiencies, and dissipative losses.
2.2.5 Multi-Period Economic Dispatch
Working within the idealized setting considered, we now formulate the problem of
multi-period economic dispatch with storage. Broadly, the objective of the ISO is
to select a vector of nodal prices for energy that sustains a competitive equilibrium
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between supply and demand at a feasible system operating point that maximizes
social welfare – a so-called economic dispatch. Formally, the multi-period economic
dispatch problem is stated as:
minimize
N−1∑
k=0
C(v(k), k) (2.5)
subject to v(k) + u(k) ∈ P(c), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (2.6)
ui ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n (2.7)
where the minimization is taken with respect to the variables v(k) ∈ Rn and
u(k) ∈ Rn for k = 0, . . . , N − 1. We will occasionally denote the decision variables
more compactly by the pair (V, U), where V =
[
v(0), . . . ,v(N − 1)
]
and U =[
u(0), . . . ,u(N − 1)
]
.
2.2.6 Optimality Conditions
Definition 2.2.2 A pair (V, U) is a feasible dispatch if it satisfies constraints
(2.6)-(2.7). A pair (V, U) is an (optimal) economic dispatch if it solves problem
(2.5)-(2.7).
The multi-period economic dispatch problem (2.5) - (2.7) is a convex opti-
mization problem with linear constraints. As such, an economic dispatch (V, U)
is characterized by the existence of Lagrange multipliers such that the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (2.6) - (2.13) hold. More specifically, we associate
Lagrange multipliers γ(k) ∈ R and µ(k) ∈ R2m+ with the power balance and line
flow capacity constraints (2.6) at time k, respectively. Similarly, we define νi ∈ RN+
and νi ∈ RN+ as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the energy capacity con-
straints (2.7) of the storage device at node i. In specifying the KKT conditions,
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it will be convenient to define as λ(k) ∈ Rn a particular linear combination of
Lagrange multipliers given by:
λ(k) = γ(k)1−H>µ(k) (2.8)
for each time k = 0, . . . , N − 1. The stationarity condition is given by:
∇C(v(k), k) = λ(k), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (2.9)
L>(νi − νi) = λi, i = 1, . . . , n (2.10)
where we have defined λi =
[
λi(0), . . . , λi(N − 1)
]>
. The complementary slack-
ness condition is given by:
µ(k) ◦ (H(v(k) + u(k))− c) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (2.11)
νi ◦ Lui = 0, i = 1, . . . , n (2.12)
νi ◦ (bi − Lui) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.13)
It will occasionally prove convenient to work with alternative arrangements
of the Lagrange multipliers defined above. Accordingly, we define the vector
µ` =
[
µ`(0), . . . , µ`(N − 1)
]>
as the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated
with each transmission line constraint ` = 1, . . . , 2m. In addition, the vectors
ν(k) =
[
ν1(k), . . . , νn(k)
]>
and ν(k) =
[
ν1(k), . . . , νn(k)
]>
denote the collection
of Lagrange multipliers associated with the lower and upper bounds on storage
capacity, respectively, for each time k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
2.3 Financial Storage Rights
In this section, we outline the concept of financial storage rights (FSRs), and de-
velop their basic properties within the context of a nodal spot market for energy.
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Broadly, FSRs amount to financial instruments, which enable the decoupling of the
ownership of storage capacity from its physical operation. This is accomplished
through the allocation of financial property rights to storage in the form of en-
titlements to the merchandising surplus generated by the centralized dispatch of
the storage assets. Specifically, a FSR is defined as a sequence of hourly injec-
tions/withdrawals at a specific node in the power network, which yields the holder
a payoff according to the corresponding sequence of nodal spot prices. Being de-
fined as such, FSRs provide energy market participants the ability to hedge their
intertemporal exposure to hourly price variability at specific nodes in the power
network. And while FSRs are essentially strips of forward energy contracts, what
makes this class of financial instruments unique is the fact that FSRs are issued
under the physical cover of storage capacity and are funded by the surplus (i.e.,
the intertemporal arbitrage value) that centrally operated storage generates in the
spot market.
In what follows, we investigate the revenue adequacy of such instruments in the
context of electricity markets employing locational marginal pricing. In particular,
we establish conditions under which the allocation of both financial storage and
transmission rights is guaranteed to be revenue adequate, i.e., the merchandising
surplus collected by the ISO is sufficient to cover the net settlement to all holders of
financial storage and transmission rights. We begin with a definition of locational
marginal prices under multi-period economic dispatch with energy storage, in the
following section.
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2.3.1 Locational Marginal Pricing
We refer to λ(k) ∈ Rn as the vector of nodal prices at time k. More specifically,
the ith element, λi(k), denotes the price at which energy is transacted at node i and
time k. We denote by Λ =
[
λ(0), . . . ,λ(N − 1)
]
the corresponding sequence of
nodal prices from time k = 0 to N − 1. We have the following standard definitions
of market equilibrium and efficiency.
Definition 2.3.1 The triple (V, U,Λ) constitutes a market equilibrium if it sat-
isfies (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9). The triple (V, U,Λ) is said to be an efficient market
equilibrium if (V, U) is also an economic dispatch.
The requirement that (V, U) satisfy (2.6) and (2.7) in Definition 2.3.1 can be
interpreted as market clearing and feasibility conditions, respectively, as they re-
quire that supply equal demand at each time period, while ensuring that the line
flow and storage capacity constraints are met. Condition (2.9) is tantamount to
requiring consumer and supplier equilibrium at every node and time period. In
other words, relation (2.9) requires that the marginal cost of supply (benefit of
demand) equal the nodal price λi(k) for all nodes i and time periods k. Conse-
quently, at equilibrium, there is no opportunity for the profitable trading of energy
across nodes or time.
It is important to note that there may exist multiple market equilibria – some
of which may not be efficient. In other words, the system operating point at a
market equilibrium may not maximize social welfare. One can, however, imple-
ment an economic dispatch (V, U) at a market equilibrium (V, U,Λ), if the nodal
prices Λ are set according to (2.8) – the Lagrange multipliers derived at the cor-
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responding economic dispatch. Such approach to spot pricing is generally referred
to as locational marginal pricing (LMP) [121].
2.3.2 Merchandising Surplus
In selecting and implementing a market equilibrium (V, U,Λ), the ISO collects
payment from the consumers and remunerates the suppliers according to their
respective operating points and nodal prices. In doing so, the ISO may collect a
nonzero surplus. We refer to this excess as the merchandising surplus (MS). Indeed,
it is a straightforward generalization of [142] to show that the MS can be either
positive or negative at an arbitrary market equilibrium. The latter outcome is
undesirable, as it may require the ISO to incur a fiscal deficit in clearing the market.
In what follows, we briefly discuss the effects of dispatch efficiency and congestion,
in both transmission and storage, on the MS. First, we have a definition.
Definition 2.3.2 The merchandising surplus (MS) at a market equilibrium
(V, U,Λ) is defined as
MS = −
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i=1
λi(k)vi(k), (2.14)
or, equivalently, as MS = −trace(Λ>V ).
One can massage the expression for the MS in (2.3.2) to reveal the specific
impact that both transmission and storage congestion have on its value. In order
to do so, we must first specify the line flows induced by the net injection profile for
each time period. More formally, let (V, U) be an arbitrary feasible dispatch. And
denote by pij(k) the resulting power flow over the line from node i to node j at
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time k.3 We adopt a sign convention such that pij(k) = −pji(k) > 0, if power flows
from node i to j. It follows from Kirchhoff’s Current Law that vi(k) + ui(k) =∑n
j=1 pij(k) for all nodes i = 1, . . . , n. Using this relation, one can decompose the
merchandising surplus as
MS = TCS + SCS. (2.15)
The first term in the decomposition is commonly referred to as the transmission
congestion surplus (TCS). The second term, we refer to as the storage congestion
surplus (SCS). Each term satisfies:
TCS =
1
2
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i,j=1
(λj(k)− λi(k)) pij(k), (2.16)
SCS =
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i=1
λi(k)ui(k). (2.17)
Lemma 2.3.3 The MS, TCS, and SCS derived at an efficient market equilibrium
(V, U,Λ) are nonnegative quantities.
Lemma 2.3.3 reveals an important property. Namely, at an efficient market
equilibrium, the collective transactions between supply and demand are guaranteed
to be revenue adequate (i.e., MS ≥ 0). Moreover, the reformulation of the MS in
(2.15) reveals a decomposition of the effects due to congestion in transmission and
storage on the rent collected by the ISO.
Assumption 1 For the remainder of the paper, we let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient
market equilibrium, unless otherwise specified.
3According to the formulation of DC power flow considered in Section 2.2.2, the line flow pij(k)
corresponds to a single entry of the vector H(v(k) + u(k)). And if there is no line connecting
nodes i and j, then pij(k) = −pji(k) = 0 necessarily.
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2.3.3 Financial Transmission Rights
In the event that there is transmission congestion at an economic dispatch and the
ISO does indeed collect a positive merchandising surplus, it is common practice in
US electricity markets to reallocate the MS in the form of financial transmission
rights [101]. Essentially, a financial transmission right entitles its holder to receive
a fraction of the transmission congestion surplus (TCS) collected by the ISO in
clearing the spot market [64]. Financial transmission rights can be specified in
variety of ways, with the two most predominant types being defined as point-to-
point and flow-based rights.
A point-to-point financial transmission right (FTR) is specified in terms of a
quantity of power, a point of injection, and a point of withdrawal. It yields the
holder the entitlement to receive, or obligation to pay, the difference in nodal spot
prices between the chosen point of withdrawal and the point of delivery, times the
nominated quantity of power. Accordingly, an FTR may amount to a credit or
liability. We have the following definition.
Definition 2.3.4 A point-to-point financial transmission right (FTR) is any triple
(i, j, tij), where i denotes an injection node, j a withdrawal node, and tij ∈ RN+ an
hourly power profile spanning N time periods. The FTR yields the holder a rent
(or liability) equal to (λj − λi)>tij. We refer to the FTR more compactly as tij.
Remark 2.3.5 We have implicitly required injection/extraction symmetry in our
definition of FTRs, as we have considered a lossless model of power flow. We refer
the reader to [107] for a more general characterization of FTRs that accommodates
lossy transmission networks.
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FTRs have become an important component of LMP-based electricity markets,
in part, because of their ability to provide market participants with an effective
hedge against transmission congestion costs for long-term energy transactions in-
volving known injection and withdrawal points within the transmission network.4
Flow-based or flowgate rights (FGRs) have also been proposed as a viable alter-
native or complement to FTRs [26, 28, 130]. Specifically, a FGR is a link-based
transmission right, specified in terms of directed transmission link, and quantity
of power flow along that link. It yields the holder the entitlement to receive a
payment equal to the Lagrange multiplier (i.e., shadow price) associated with the
chosen link’s capacity constraint multiplied the nominated quantity of power flow.
Note that the rent due to a FGR is guaranteed to be nonnegative, as the corre-
sponding shadow prices on transmission constraints are necessarily nonnegative.
We have the following definition of FGRs according to the model considered in
this paper.
Definition 2.3.6 A flowgate right (FGR) is any double (`, f `), where the index
` ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} denotes a directed transmission link, and f ` ∈ RN+ a hourly power
profile spanning N time periods. The FGR yields the holder a rent of µ>` f `. We
refer to the FGR more compactly as f `.
Although FGRs are not currently offered in the majority of transmission rights
auctions that are in operation today, the theoretical literature on the subject has
converged on the viewpoint that both FTRs and FGRs could and should coexist,
thereby allowing market participants the ability to decide as to what mix of rights is
best [28,100,101]. We adopt this perspective, and develop our mathematical results
in a framework that is general enough to accommodate both types of financial
4 We refer the reader to [116] for a recent survey on financial transmission rights.
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rights. Accordingly, we denote an arbitrary collection of FTRs and FGRs by the
pair (T ,F), where
T = {tij | i, j = 1, . . . , n} and F = {f ` | ` = 1, . . . , 2m}.
Here, tij is the sum of all FTRs of the same type (i, j), and f ` is the sum of all
FGRs of the same type `.
In what follows, we investigate the revenue adequacy of transmission rights
in nodal spot markets based on multi-period economic dispatch with storage. In
particular, we establish conditions on the joint allocation of FTRs and FGRs,
under which the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO is sufficient to cover
their net settlement.
Definition 2.3.7 The rent due to a collection of transmission rights (T ,F) is
defined as
Φ(T ,F) =
n∑
i,j=1
(λj − λi)>tij +
2m∑
`=1
µ>` f `.
In general, the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO will not equal the
rent due to a collection of transmission rights. Their allocation must, therefore,
be restricted in such a manner as to guarantee that the ISO does not incur a
financial shortfall. A well known requirement is the simultaneous feasibility test
(SFT) [64, 107, 142]. We now extend this notion to the multi-period setting to
accommodate the enlargement of the set of feasible power injections due to the
presence of storage capacity.
We first require additional notation. For each time period k = 0, . . . , N − 1,
denote by t(k) ∈ Rn the net injection vector induced by a collection of FTRs in T ,
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and by f(k) ∈ R2m the vector of direction-specific flowgates induced by a collection
of FGRs in F .5
Definition 2.3.8 A collection of transmission rights (T ,F) are said to be simul-
taneously feasible if there exists a sequence of storage injections Q ∈ Rn×N , which
is feasible according to
t(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1
qi ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n.
In other words, a collection of transmission rights (T ,F) are simultaneously
feasible if the sequence of nodal injections induced by the FTRs in T can be
reshaped by a feasible sequence of storage injections so that the resulting nodal
injections induce power flows that respect the transmission capacity limits, derated
according to the FGRs in F . We have the following result, which establishes
revenue adequacy for any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission rights.
Lemma 2.3.9 If (T ,F) are a simultaneously feasible collection of transmission
rights, then their corresponding rent satisfies
Φ(T ,F) ≤ TCS. (2.18)
This inequality is tight, in the sense that there exists a simultaneously feasible
collection of transmission rights with a corresponding rent equal to the TCS.
Lemma 2.3.9 reveals that a simultaneously feasible collection of transmission
rights cannot yield a rent, which exceeds the transmission congestion surplus
5Accordingly, the ith element of the net injection vector t(k) is given by ti(k) =
∑n
j=1(tij(k)−
tji(k)), and the `th element of the flowgate vector f(k) is given by the kth element of the FGR
f `.
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(TCS). While this ensures the revenue adequacy of the ISO, it also points to
the fact that transmission rights, alone, are incapable of capturing the entire mer-
chandising surplus (MS) collected by the ISO, in general. We thus define financial
storage rights – a new class of financial instruments, which, in combination with
transmission rights, enable the full recovery of the MS, among other benefits to
market participants.
2.3.4 Financial Storage Rights
We begin with a definition of financial storage rights.
Definition 2.3.10 A financial storage right (FSR) is any double (i, si), where i
denotes a withdrawal node, and si ∈ RN a hourly power profile spanning N time
periods. The FSR yields the holder a rent (or liability) equal to λ>i si. We refer to
the FSR more compactly as si.
Before embarking upon a formal analysis of FSRs and their properties, we pro-
vide a brief qualitative discussion surrounding their structure and potential use.
First, FSRs can be thought as financial property rights to storage capacity; or,
more accurately, as entitlements to the intertemporal arbitrage gains that storage
generates under its socially optimal operation, i.e., the storage congestion sur-
plus (SCS). Being defined as such, FSRs enable the complete decoupling between
the actual operation of storage facilities and the settlement of storage congestion
charges. Second, as tradable property rights, FSRs can be sold in forward auctions
coordinated by the ISO; and the revenue generated by such auctions could serve
to incentivize merchant investment in storage – not unlike the role of FTRs in par-
tially supporting the remuneration of merchant transmission investments [63,75].
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Third, from the perspective of its holder, a FSR is equivalent to a strip of forward
energy contracts. Accordingly, FSRs yield market participants the ability to per-
fectly hedge physical or financial positions in the spot market against intertemporal
price risk. Such hedging capabilities represent a natural complement to FTRs and
their ability to hedge spatial price risk across the network. Finally, an important
factor distinguishing FSRs from standard forward energy contracts, is the crucial
fact that FSRs are issued under the physical cover of storage capacity and settled
against the SCS collected by the ISO, as opposed to the revenue generated from
contract sales.
Different forms of financial entitlements to the storage infrastructure can be
envisioned. For instance, Taylor [134] proposes an alternative form of financial
storage rights, which are defined in terms of specific storage facilities, and entitle
their holder to receive the shadow price on a storage facility’s energy capacity
constraint times the nominated quantity of energy. We refer to this alternative
form of financial rights as energy capacity rights (ECRs). Working within the
confines of our idealized storage model, ECRs can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.11 An energy capacity right (ECR) is any double (i, ei), where
the index i denotes a storage asset, and ei ∈ RN+ a hourly energy profile spanning
N time periods. The ECR yields the holder a rent of ν>i ei. We refer to the ECR
more compactly as ei.
Remark 2.3.12 In the presence of additional constraints, which limit the rate at
which a storage facility can be charged or discharged, one can expand the definition
of ECRs to include another class of financial rights that entitle their holder to
receive the shadow price on the storage facility’s power capacity constraint times
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the nominated quantity of power. Taylor [134] refers to such instruments as power
capacity rights (PCRs).
Definition 2.3.11 is in contrast to our profile-based definition of FSRs (cf. Def-
inition 2.3.10). Intuitively, the relationship between FSRs and ECRs is analogous
to the relationship between FTRs and FGRs. And, to a large extent, the advan-
tages and disadvantages of FSRs versus ECRs mirror those of FTRs as compared
to FGRs.6 For example, while FTRs (FSRs) are convenient instruments for hedg-
ing spatial (intertemporal) price risk, FGRs (ECRs) are instruments better suited
for remunerating property rights to specific transmission lines (storage facilities).
In Section 2.3.5, we present conditions on the joint offering of transmission and
storage rights under which the ISO is guaranteed to be revenue adequate. To that
end, we first define the rent due to a collection of FSRs and ECRs. We denote an
arbitrary collection of FSRs and ECRs by the pair (S, E), where
S = {si | i = 1, . . . , n} and E = {ei | i = 1, . . . , n}.
Here, si is the sum of all FSRs of the same type i, and ei is the sum of all ECRs
of the same type i.
Definition 2.3.13 The rent due to a collection of storage rights (S, E) is defined
as
Σ(S, E) =
n∑
i=1
λ>i si + ν
>
i ei.
6We refer the reader to [28,100–102,117] for detailed discussions surrounding such comparisons
in the context of transmission rights.
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2.3.5 A Generalized Simultaneous Feasibility Test
We now extend our definition of multi-period simultaneous feasibility to accom-
modate a combination of both transmission and storage rights.
Definition 2.3.14 A collection of transmission and storage rights (T ,F ,S, E) are
said to be simultaneously feasible if there exists a sequence of storage injections
Q ∈ Rn×N , which is feasible according to
t(k)− s(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (2.19)
qi ∈ U(bi − ei), i = 1, . . . , n. (2.20)
Remark 2.3.15 (Accommodating Inefficiencies in Storage) While we have
thus far operated under the assumption of perfectly efficient storage facilities, it is
straightforward to extend the definition of simultaneous feasibility in Definition
2.3.14 to accommodate dissipative losses and conversion inefficiencies in storage
by simply refining the underlying storage constraints on which it is based.
Essentially, a collection of transmission and storage rights are simultaneously
feasible if the nodal injections induced by the FTRs in T and FSRs in S can
be reshaped by a sequence of storage injections, which both respect the storage
capacity constraints (derated according to the ECRs in E), and result in power
flows that do not violate the transmission capacity constraints (derated according
to the FGRs in F). Notice that, in the absence of storage rights, this generalized
definition of simultaneously feasibility reduces to Definition 2.3.8. The following
result characterizes the maximum rent achievable by any simultaneously feasible
collection of transmission and storage rights.
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Theorem 2.3.16 If (T ,F ,S, E) are a simultaneously feasible collection of trans-
mission and storage rights, then their corresponding rent satisfies
Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) ≤ MS. (2.21)
Moreover, this inequality is tight, in the sense that there exists a simultaneously
feasible collection of rights (T ,F ,S, E) with an associated rent equal to MS.
Theorem 2.3.16 is reassuring, as it guarantees revenue adequacy on behalf of
the ISO when jointly issuing transmission and storage rights in a manner that is
simultaneously feasible. More precisely, given a fixed configuration of transmission
and storage facilities, the MS collected by the ISO in the spot market suffices
to cover the rents of all outstanding transmission and storage rights. Revenue
adequacy is not, however, guaranteed in the event of unplanned contingencies, as
the configuration of transmission and/or storage facilities may deviate from what
was assumed in the simultaneous feasibility test. The ISO must, therefore, specify
a mechanism to compensate potential revenue shortfalls that might arise in the
event that such contingencies occur.7
7 We refer the reader to [102, Sec. 3.6], which examines several mechanisms to cover revenue
shortfalls that might occur when settling payments to FTR holders in the event of transmission
line contingencies. For example, PJM handles revenue inadequacy in settling FTR payments
by prorating the revenue shortfall among the FTR holders; whereas, in NYISO-run markets,
transmission line owners are held responsible for the shortfall [101]. A mechanism of the former
type generally transfers the risk of shortfall to the FTR holders, undermines the ability of FTRs to
provide perfect price hedges, and is vulnerable to gaming due to the socialization of the shortfalls.
Conversely, a mechanism of the latter type fully funds the outstanding rights, thereby transferring
the risk of shortfall to the transmission line owners themselves. An argument in favor of such
a mechanism is that it provides an incentive to transmission line owners to effectively maintain
their assets, and avoids the socialization of revenue shortfalls among the FTR holders [101,102].
29
2.4 An Illustration of the Use of FSRs
The natural variation of nodal spot prices over both location and time exposes
market participants to price risk. Extreme price volatility is particularly problem-
atic for load serving entities (LSEs) that sell electricity to end-use customers at a
fixed and predetermined price, as they face the risk that the spot price at which
they pay for energy may considerably exceed the fixed price at which they are re-
munerated during certain hours of the day. Accordingly, LSEs and, more generally,
those market participants seeking price stability in their transactions, may wish
to hedge their exposure to such price risk. In the following discussion, we explain
how FSRs, in combination with contracts for differences (CFDs) and FTRs, can be
employed to fully hedge a long-term bilateral contract for energy, when the seller
and buyer may exhibit differing intertemporal supply and demand characteristics,
respectively. As a special case, the framework considered accommodates the set-
ting in which the seller is physically constrained to deliver the contracted amount
of energy through a constant power profile over a predetermined interval of time,
while the buyer is compelled to consume that amount of energy according a power
profile that (predictably) fluctuates over that same interval of time, due in part to
the inelastic nature of its demand.
We consider the setting in which a demander at node j would like to buy an
amount of energy qc (MWh) from a supplier at node i to be delivered over N
time periods at a fixed price λc ($/MWh). The supplier is assumed to deliver this
quantity of energy according to the production profile qi ∈ RN , while the demander
is assumed to consume that same amount of energy according to the consumption
profile qj ∈ RN . While the production and consumption profiles need not agree
at any given time period, they must balance over time, i.e., 1>qi = 1
>qj = qc.
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In addition, it is assumed that both the demander and supplier are required to
trade with the ISO according to their respective nodal spot prices. Accordingly,
the demander pays λ>j qj, and supplier is paid λ
>
i qi in the spot market. Because
nodal spot prices will naturally vary over both time and location, and will therefore
differ from the contract price λc, a hedge is required in order to execute the fixed
price contract between the supplier and demander. In what follows, we explain
how a combination of a CFD, FTR, and FSR can be employed to perfectly hedge
such price differences.
In general, the supplier will lose an amount λcqc−λ>i qi and the demander will
gain an amount λcqc − λ>j qj, as a result of their respective spot market transac-
tions.8 In the event that nodal spot prices are constant over both location and
time, it is straightforward to see that the amount lost by the supplier is equal to
the amount gained by the demander. Thus, a simple money transfer between the
two parties in that amount is sufficient to perfectly hedge the fixed price contract.
Such transfer can be accomplished with a CFD, which requires that the demander
pay the supplier the amount λcqc−λ>i qi, as is recorded in the second line of Table
2.1.
More generally, the CFD specified above leaves the demander exposed to a
transmission congestion charge when nodal spot prices vary over location, and a
storage congestion charge when nodal spot prices vary over time.9 The specific form
these congestion charges is made explicit in the following expression (2.22), which
disentangles the individual effects that locational and temporal price differences
have on the demander’s market exposure after having settled the CFD with the
8Clearly, each of these amounts is as equally likely to be negative as positive, depending on
the specific values of the contract price and nodal spot prices.
9Of course, this is but one of several natural ways in which the CFD might be specified.
Alternative specifications that entail risk sharing between the supplier and demander can also be
envisaged.
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supplier.
λ>j qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
spot market
charge
+ (λcqc − λ>i qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CFD charge
= λcqc + (λj − λi)>qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
transmission congestion
charge
+ λ>j (qj − qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
storage congestion
charge
(2.22)
It is straightforward to see that the transmission (storage) congestion charge van-
ishes when the nodal spot prices are constant across location (time). In the event
that nodal spot prices vary over location, the resulting transmission congestion
charge can be perfectly hedged with a FTR from node i to node j given by tij := qi.
Similarly, a FSR at node j given by sj := qj−qi yields a perfect hedge against the
storage congestion charge, in the event that nodal spot prices vary across time.10
Essentially, this FSR yields the demander a hedge, which is identical to that which
could have been produced using a physical storage facility to purchase the profile
qi − qj in the spot market at node j.
In combination with the CFD, the procurement of a FTR and a FSR by the
demander yields a perfectly hedged, fixed price contract between the supplier and
demander – provided that both parties deliver and consume power according to
the profiles specified by the contract. However, as is argued in [21], such price risk
cannot be costlessly eliminated, as FTRs and FSRs will, in general, have nonzero
value in expectation. We refer the reader to Table 2.1 for a detailed accounting of
the transactions described in the preceding discussion.
10It is worth mentioning that, should the two parties enter into a bilateral contract specifying
common production and consumption profiles, i.e., qi = qj , the storage congestion charge would
vanish – thereby eliminating the need for the procurement of a FSR in the pursuit of a perfectly
hedged, fixed price contract.
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Contract or Market
Supplier at node i Demander at node j
Quantity Payment Quantity Payment
1 Spot market qi λ
>
i qi −qj −λ>j qj
2 CFD qi λcqc − λ>i qi −qi −(λcqc − λ>i qi)
3 FTR – – tij := qi (λj − λi)>tij
4 FSR – – sj := qj − qi λ>j sj
5 Total – λcqc – −λcqc
Table 2.1: Using CFDs, FTRs, and FSRs to synthesize bilateral contracts.
2.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a general regulatory and market framework to
enable the open access integration of storage, in which storage is treated as a com-
munal asset accessible by all market participants. Such an approach represents
a substantial departure from the more standard storage integration paradigm in
which a storage owner-operator pursues her individual profit maximizing interests
within the confines of her local spot market. Central to our proposal is the con-
cept of financial storage rights (FSRs), which are defined as a sequence of nodal
power injections and withdrawals that yield the holder a payment according to the
corresponding sequence of nodal prices. Qualitatively, FSRs represent financial
property rights to the capacity of centrally operated storage facilities. This is in
sharp contrast to the physical rights proposed in [59]. An essential advantage of
FSRs and the modus operandi they entail is that their allocation does not inter-
fere with the socially optimal operation of storage or the independence of the ISO,
regardless of the ownership structure of the storage facilities. Most importantly,
FSRs enable the synthesis of fully hedged, fixed-price bilateral contracts for en-
ergy, when the seller and buyer exhibit differing intertemporal supply and demand
33
characteristics, respectively.
More broadly, we envision storage owners trading such FSRs with other market
participants through (short and long term) forward auctions and secondary mar-
kets centrally coordinated by the ISO; not unlike markets for FTRs today. And,
by selling financial rights to their energy storage capacity in various forward auc-
tions (e.g., yearly, quarterly, etc.), storage owners can more finely manage their
exposure to spot price volatility. In addition, the auction revenue derived from
the forward sale of FSRs may serve as a transparent long-term market signal to
partially guide merchant investment in storage.
The study of financial storage rights presented in this paper represents an ini-
tial point of analysis. Many interesting questions remain. First, how should the
ISO structure an auction mechanism to jointly allocate both financial transmission
and storage rights? For instance, the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) that we
propose would require coordination in clearing both the transmission and storage
right auctions. This might be too cumbersome to be practical. Accordingly, it
would be of interest to explore the design of alternative conditions for simultane-
ous feasibility that would enable the decoupling of transmission and storage right
auctions. Second, the potential value that energy storage offers to the power sys-
tem goes well beyond the application of intertemporal energy arbitrage considered
in this paper [126]. For example, certain storage technologies posses the capability
of providing voltage support or frequency regulation services. A natural question
then, is how might one expand the concept of FSRs to incorporate these value
streams as well? Third, it would be of interest to generalize the market framework
considered to accommodate a broader family of technologies capable of shifting
energy in time (e.g., flexible demand-side resources).
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CHAPTER 3
A CONTEXTUAL DISCUSSION OF FSRS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter clarifies the scope of the approach to Open Access Storage (OAS)
described in Chapter 2. It aims to clarify how the proposed mechanism fits within
the current architecture of U.S. wholesale electricity markets. To that end, it also
elaborates on possible generalizations that enable the monetization of multiple
services that storage resources can provide beyond energy arbitrage.
The proposed approach to OAS is a dedicated mechanism for storage resources
to participate in wholesale markets. Part of its motivation is a concern from
academia and the industry that storage resources may be facing avoidable barriers
impeding their participation in wholesale markets (e.g., see [5, 53, 82, 126, 135,
136, 139]). This participation mechanism is not mandatory nor comprehensive.
Rather, it is optional and dedicated to coordinate specifically the provision of a
single service, namely, inter-hour energy arbitrage. In other words, the mechanism
should be thought as an optional path for storage owner-operators to monetize the
inter-hour energy arbitrage capabilities of their storage resources in ISO markets.
As such, it is an alternative to the existing bid-based mechanisms to participate
in the day-ahead market (DAM) and the concomitant LMP-based compensation.
As suggested in Section 2.1, the proposed mechanism consists of two parts: (i)
an operational arrangement, and (ii) a compensation scheme. We discuss relevant
aspects of each of them.
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3.2 Centralized operational arrangement
Broadly, the first part is an agreement —between the ISO and storage owner-
operators— to dispatch the participating storage resources in a centralized manner.
That is, the agreement entitles the ISO to dispatch storage resources in the DAM
based on their operational constraints and parameters rather than on economic
bids (e.g., price-quantity pairs). Such arrangement is virtually equivalent to that
used by the ISO to utilize transmission assets. The multi-period economic dispatch
formulation that represents the DAM auction in Section 2.2 illustrates the arrange-
ment. Therein, the ISO relies on a storage model embodied by a set of constraints
—such as (2.4)— and no bids or offers to produce an efficient market equilibrium,
which specifies day-ahead hourly dispatch signals for the storage resources. In
other words, the proposed mechanism explicitly internalizes the operational con-
straints of storage resources into the DAM auction rendering unnecessary1 the use
of hourly bids and offers to internalize them.
We elaborate on three points that clarify how the proposed mechanism fits
the current architecture of U.S. wholesale markets. First, rather than economic
bids, storage owner-operators would need to report to the ISO the parameters of
a predetermined storage model. The storage parameters and model need to match
those used in the FSR auctions in order to guarantee the ISOs revenue adequacy2.
Hence, the storage parameters need to be reported ahead of delivery time before
the FTR auctions take place. This type of consistency between models is also
required in the context of the transmission network and FTRs to guarantee the
ISOs revenue adequacy [64].
1Except perhaps daily boundary parameters necessary to value the initial and terminal state
of charge in the storage resources.
2This may represent a challenge for daily boundary conditions that are inherent part of the
model, such as the initial and terminal state of charge, which are likely to vary on a daily basis.
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Second, the day-ahead dispatch signals of the participating storage resources
would be financially binding as in current two settlement markets. In other words,
the day-ahead market clearing quantities would not dictate the actual operation of
storage. Rather, real-time deviations would be allowed, and they could be settled in
existing real-time markets. In an energy-only two-settlement system, for example,
real-time deviations from day-ahead quantities are settled at the real-time energy
prices [131, Chap. 3-2]. Hence, the proposed mechanism does not impede the
simultaneous participation of storage resources in the real-time market, which can
be a relevant source of revenue. Indeed, while the proposed mechanism monetizes
the inter-hour energy arbitrage capabilities (through FSRs), the real-time market
monetizes the intra-hour energy arbitrage capabilities.
Third and last, the simplified multi-period economic dispatch formulation used
in Chapter 2.2 —to represent the DAM auction— does not consider the procure-
ment of ancillary services such as frequency regulation and reserves. These are
services that storage resources can provide and on which they are likely to depend
on to demonstrate financial viability [114, 126, 129]. Hence, a natural question
emerges; how can the proposed operational arrangement accommodate the simul-
taneous provision of both energy and ancillary services in the DAM? We envision
and briefly describe two alternatives.
The first alternative to accommodate ancillary services is a natural generaliza-
tion of the described operational arrangement. It consists in allowing the ISO to
use storage resources to provide both energy and ancillary services based solely on
their physical models. This method allocates endogenously the capacity attributes
of the storage resources among the various services they can provide. Under this
generalization, the revenue adequacy of the ISO would still be guaranteed provided
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that the ancillary services are appropriately settled using Lagrange multipliers as
prices. In this case, the surplus generated by the participating storage resources
attributable to the provision of ancillary services would be collected by the ISO as
part of the merchandising surplus.
The second alternative to accommodate ancillary services is a variation of the
first one. It differs in that it allows storage owner-operators to submit offers to
provide ancillary services and collect the associated payments. Settling these pay-
ments, however, leave the ISO at risk of revenue inadequacy. A way to recover
revenue adequacy is to make the storage owner-operators liable for any shortfalls
the ISO may encounter. Different methods to allocate shortfalls among the storage
owner-operators can be envisioned, e.g., based on the number of rights underwrit-
ten or on the payments received for ancillary services.
3.3 FSR-based compensation scheme
The second part of the proposed mechanism specifies a compensation scheme. As
described in Chapter 2, FSRs embody the compensation system. Intuitively, they
are an indirect payment mechanism that is in contrast to the direct payments that
take place in a typical DAM. More specifically, rather than receiving a stream
of daily payments in the DAM, storage owner-operators are given tradable en-
titlements to said future payments (in the form of financial derivatives). These
derivatives can be sold in forward markets to other market participants. These
forward sales amount to exchanging of a stream of uncertain future daily pay-
ments for a single certain payment. Hence, selling FSRs is a way to mitigate the
revenue risk and volatility that storage resources derive from energy arbitrage. The
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FSR based compensation thus gives storage owner-operators the option to either
monetize their energy arbitrage capabilities in forward markets or the DAM (by
holding on to their FSR and the associated rents).
It is worth emphasizing that centralized operational arrangements —as the
proposed one— are not uncommon to the power industry. Indeed, in [139], the
authors claim that some ISOs have started to respond to FERC’s Order No. 8903
by creating a dedicated classification for storage resources that internalizes some of
their operational constraints into the DAM auction. More recently, FERC further
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) that would mandate all ISOs to
incorporate a standard storage participation model that internalizes some of their
intertemporal dynamics and constraints [53]. However, the proposed FSR-based
compensation mechanism effectively offers a different approach to the integration
of storage resources into wholesale markets. It replaces a mechanism based on
day-ahead arbitrage gains with a mechanism to rent storage capacity to the ISO
in exchange of tradable financial entitlements. These entitlements or rights can
be traded —at the storage owner-operators convenience— anytime between the
initial FSR allocation and the day before delivery.
A final point of examination is whether a market for FSRs —or functionally
equivalent financial products, for that matter— can be recognized as an ancil-
lary benefit of the proposed mechanism. In theory, an FSR market can be im-
plemented without centrally operated storage resources. However, these storage
resources serve to increase the FSR market liquidity; without them, liquidity would
be highly limited due to the need to guarantee the ISO’s revenue adequacy. This
link between the use of centrally operated assets and liquidity is explained by [41]
3As described in [139], the FERC Order requires wholesale markets to consider non-generation
resources for their grid service. See [51] for a summary of the Final Order [52].
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in the context of transmission lines and FTR markets. Therein, the authors argue
that the revenue adequacy condition imposed by the auction on the FTRs imposes
specific liquidity constraints on the ISO. And, according to (2.20), increasing the
storage capacity available to the ISO constitutes a relaxation of the simultaneous
feasibility test (SFT) and thus of the revenue adequacy condition. The converse is
also true, namely, decreasing the centrally available storage capacity constitutes a
restriction of the revenue adequacy condition. The implication is clear. The larger
availability of storage resources for the ISO, the more liquid the market for FSRs
should be.
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CHAPTER 4
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF CONNECTION CHARGES—PART I: A
STOCHASTIC FRAMEWORK4
Daniel Mun˜oz-A´lvarez and Lang Tong5
This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for distribu-
tion systems with distributed energy resources such as solar power and storage. In
particular, the optimal design of dynamic two-part tariffs for a regulated monopo-
listic retailer is considered, where the retailer faces exogenous wholesale electricity
prices and fixed costs on the one hand and stochastic demands with inter-temporal
price dependencies on the other. Part I presents a general framework and analysis
for revenue adequate retail tariffs with advanced notification, dynamic prices and
uniform connection charges. It is shown that the optimal two-part tariff consists
of a dynamic price that may not match the expected wholesale price and a con-
nection charge that distributes uniformly among all customers the retailer’s fixed
costs and a price-volume risk premium. A sufficient condition for the optimality of
the derived two-part tariff among the class of arbitrary ex-ante tariffs is obtained.
Numerical simulations quantify the substantial welfare gains that the optimal two-
part tariff may bring compared to the optimal linear tariff (without connection
charge). Part II focuses on the impact of two-part tariffs on the integration of
distributed energy resources.
4This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-
1135844 and 15499. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2016 Information
Theory and Applications (ITA) Workshop in La Jolla, CA [85].
5L. Tong is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA. Email: lt35@cornell.edu
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4.1 Introduction
The electric power industry is experiencing an important transformation driven by
disruptive innovation in distributed renewable generation and energy storage sys-
tems [57]. A concern of this transformation is the impact of the inclining adoption
of said distributed energy resources (DERs) on the financial viability of regulated
distribution grid operators [114]. In particular, under the restriction to volumet-
ric and net-metering tariffs, the gradual decline in energy sales could compromise
the ability of grid operators to recover their predominantly fixed operational and
capital expenditures. This could result in the need to increase retail prices fur-
ther above wholesale electricity prices, thereby amplifying the entailed economic
inefficiencies, inter-customer cross-subsidies, and incentives for DER adoption in a
vicious circle.
This two-part paper aims to shed lights on the effectiveness of connection
charges as a means to mitigate the negative impacts of the sustained adoption
of DERs. To this end, Part I (Chapter 4) [87] develops a framework to analyze
the efficiency of retail electricity tariffs set for a regulated retailer who serves a
heterogeneous population of residential customers under demand and wholesale
price uncertainties.
In particular, we are interested in two practical and fairly general ex-ante retail
pricing models: a volumetric linear tariff and a two-part tariff consisting of a
volumetric linear charge and a connection charge. Our goal in Part I is to gain
insights into the structure of the optimal revenue adequate linear and two-part
tariffs that allow us to analyze, in Part II (Chapter 5) [88], the effects of integrating
customer and retailer-owned DERs.
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4.1.1 Related Work
There is a vast literature on efficient retail pricing of electricity, the economic
foundations of which reside in the classical theory of public utility pricing and
peak-load pricing [19]—known more recently as dynamic pricing [72]. According
to [34, 72], the basic theory of peak-load pricing dates back to [22, 23], and its
direct application to retail electricity pricing has been around for more than 60
years (e.g., [9, 128]). Several works have surveyed this theory (e.g., [19,34,140]).
More recent reviews of the subject, along with a brief history of its slow and partial
adoption by regulators and electric utilities, can be found in [17,141].
In this context, the inability to fully recover the predominantly fixed costs
of utilities through marginal cost pricing is typically approached by imposing a
breakeven constraint (or revenue adequacy constraint) [34]. The resulting con-
strained price optimization is closely related to the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing strat-
egy, which derives its name from Ramsey’s classical contribution to the theory of
optimal taxation [110] and Boiteux’s application to natural monopolies [10].
As an alternative to the optimal linear tariffs characterized in the theory of
peak-load pricing as optimal deviations from marginal cost pricing, two-part tariffs
(e.g., [3, 50, 99, 103]) and other nonlinear tariffs were used as a means to raise
additional revenue to recover the utilities’ predominantly fixed costs [19,34,140]. In
the U.S., mild connection charges are prevalent with exceptions such as California,
where the large investor-owned utilities have used default volumetric residential
tariffs with virtually no connection charges1 [12].
1PG&E and SDG&E have no connection charge whereas SCE’s charges $0.99/month. While
these utilities have a minimum bill of $10/month or less, it is binding on extremely few customers,
and thus practically irrelevant [12].
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In the last two decades, while the adoption of time-varying prices has been
particularly slow in the U.S. [72], the advent of cheaper smart meters, small-
scale renewable energy installations, battery storage technologies and home energy
management tools has stimulated research in dynamic pricing (see [42, 137] and
references therein) as sophisticated technologies can enable customers to react to
price signals [49, 118]. Of particular interest is real-time pricing (RTP), a form
of dynamic pricing widely known to be a critical feature of efficient electricity
markets [14]. An overview of dynamic pricing and a recent analysis of its limited
adoption in the U.S. are available in [14] and [72], respectively.
Economic approaches to dynamic pricing often rely on functional demand mod-
els to characterize competitive equilibrium prices when smart meters become avail-
able to customers [11, 13, 71].The most relevant analysis is [71] where the socially
optimal linear and two-part retail tariffs subject to a retailer revenue sufficiency
constraint are derived. Unlike our work, however, this analysis does not accom-
modate inter-temporal demand dependencies nor the integration of DERs.
Most engineering approaches, on the other hand, focus on analyzing de-
mand response models in smart grids [42, 118, 137]. These approaches often in-
volve modeling customer behavior [83, 84], sometimes down to the appliance level
[40, 78, 80, 122], by characterizing customers’ response to certain pricing scheme.
Appliances modeled include thermostatically controlled loads (TCL) [78,80], elec-
tric vehicles [122], and batteries [40, 143]. Other works focus on designing said
pricing schemes to induce a desired behavior anticipating customers’ response
[6,29,43,55,66,69,76,77,81,89,119,132,133,144]. For example, the work in [29] con-
siders utility-maximizing consumers and a social-welfare-maximizing supplier that
procures electricity in two steps (day-ahead and in real-time). In a multiperiod
45
and deterministic setting, the authors derive the socially optimal retail prices: a
time-differentiated linear tariff. In a similar setting where only the real-time mar-
ket and a stylized TCL model are considered, the work in [69] derives optimal
day-ahead retail prices while accommodating cost and demand uncertainty and an
implicit retailer revenue requirement2.
4.1.2 Summary of Results and Contributions
The main contribution of Part I is the explicit characterization of the optimal rev-
enue adequate ex-ante two-part tariff for a stochastic demand with inter-temporal
dependencies. The results in Part I lay the foundation for analyzing the welfare
impacts of integrating DERs such as solar power and energy storage under different
retail tariffs, which we address in Part II. Here we apply the classical Ramsey pric-
ing theory with extensions to accommodate the uncertainty and inter-temporal
dependencies of demand that arise with the integration of behind-the-meter re-
newables and storage. While economic literature has disregarded said extensions,
engineering approaches to dynamic pricing and demand response have ignored the
revenue adequacy objective of retail tariff design, which our work addresses explic-
itly. In this context, there are no existing comparable studies in the open literature
with the exception of a preliminary work in [85]. To a large extent, our results
are an examination of emerging issues in smart distribution systems through the
lens of classical economic results on the fundamental efficiency of two-part tariffs
in stylized economic models [19].
The main results of this paper are as follows. We consider the design of ex-
2The revenue requirement is incorporated indirectly into the formulation through a weighted
social welfare objective.
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ante retail tariffs from the perspective of a regulated retailer subject to a revenue
sufficiency constraint. The ex-ante tariffs considered here include traditional tariffs
with long lag times as well as some of the more sophisticated tariffs that are
being considered for smart distribution systems. Examples include time-of-use
tariffs, critical peak pricing, variable peak pricing, and real-time pricing [49]. The
retailer considered in this paper is a regulated monopoly which, on one hand, serves
heterogeneous residential customers with elastic demands. The demand model
considered here is stochastic and captures inter-temporal price dependencies. On
the other hand, the retailer interfaces with an exogenous wholesale market with
stochastic real-time prices. We describe the models in our formulation in Section
4.2.
Within this general setting, we characterize the structure of optimal linear
and two-part tariffs in the presence of demand and wholesale price uncertainty in
Section 4.3. In particular, we show that the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff consists
of a time-varying retail price that not always matches the expected wholesale price
and a connection charge that allocates uniformly among all customers the retailer’s
fixed costs and risk-related costs caused by the ex-ante determination of the tariff.
We further show that the optimal volumetric tariff, referred hereafter as linear
tariff, is characterized by a time-varying price markup—relative to the optimal
two-part tariff’s price—that depends on the retailer’s fixed costs and the price
elasticity of demand.
We further compare the efficiency of the linear and two-part tariff in Section
4.3.3. Specifically, we present a parametric characterization of the social welfare
(SW) or total surplus and the consumer surplus (CS) as a function of the retailer’s
fixed costs. We show that the two-part tariff achieves the same SW regardless of
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the retailer’s fixed costs. For the linear tariff, in contrast, the SW decreases as
the fixed costs increase, thus characterizing a trade-off between fixed costs and
efficiency. We also provide a sufficiency condition under which the two-part tariff
is optimal among all ex-ante nonlinear tariffs.
We demonstrate the performance of the derived tariffs numerically using pub-
licly available data from NYISO and the largest utility company in New York City
in Section 4.4. Contingent on the deployment of enabling technologies and smart
meters, our results estimate that the optimal day-ahead linear tariff could bring
loses (4.8% of the utility’s revenue) relative to the utility’s suboptimal two-part
flat tariff due to the lack of a connection charge. The optimal day-ahead two-
part tariff, on the other hand, could bring significant gains (8.1% of the utility’s
revenue). From a societal perspective, these loses and gains manifest themselves
as reductions and increments in electricity consumption, respectively. These esti-
mates assume a realistic own-price elasticity of demand and a stylized model for
TCL. Some concluding remarks and proofs are included in Section 4.5 and the
Appendix, respectively.
4.1.3 Notations
We use x = E[x] to denote the expectation of a random vector x ∈ Rn and
Σx,y = Cov(x, y) ∈ Rn×m to denote the cross-covariance matrix of two random
vectors x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm. Let also xk denote the kth entry of a vector x ∈ Rn and
x> its transpose.
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4.2 Model
Given our focus on the retail electricity market, we assume the state of the whole-
sale market is represented by an exogenous discrete-time random process λk ∈ R+,
which represents the wholesale RTP of electricity at time k in a single location of
interest. We assume that the time periods k = 1, . . . , N partition a billing cycle,
which is the time horizon relevant for our formulation. Moreover, we assume the
wholesale RTP accurately reflects the social marginal cost of electricity [12].
4.2.1 A Retail Tariff Model
In this paper, we consider time-differentiated retail electricity tariffs that are set
and announced in advance (i.e., ex-ante) by a regulated retailer with a fixed lag
time. These tariffs (i) are fixed before the beginning of a billing period of certain
length (e.g., a month or a day) with a fixed lag time (e.g., several days or hours),
(ii) specify a pricing rule that depends on the temporal consumption profile within
the billing period rather than on the accumulated consumption, and (iii) are al-
lowed to vary dynamically from one billing period to the next. In the context of
retail tariffs, the tariff lag time induces a tradeoff between advanced price notifica-
tion and price signal accuracy [14]. The tariff model considered here captures both
the traditional long term flat tariff that has months or years of lag time as well as
more sophisticated dynamic tariffs such as those with days or hours of advanced
notification, but it generally excludes ex-post tariffs such as those indexed to the
wholesale RTP.
Formally, some time before the billing cycle starts, the retailer announces a
tariff T : RN → R that maps the metered consumption power profile q ∈ RN of
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each customer to a scalar charge T (q) ∈ R. While the kth entry of q is a single
customer’s metered consumption in period k of the billing period, the amount
T (q) (in dollars) represents the total bill. Note that this form of tariff captures the
intertemporal dependencies of pricing and consumption within each billing cycle
(but not between several billing cycles).
Given a tariff T , customers rationally choose in real-time how much electricity
to purchase from the retailer during each consumption period of the current billing
cycle. The retailer then pays for the aggregate demand at the wholesale RTP.
Although in practice retailers buy certain portions of the aggregate demand in
forward markets (including the day-ahead market), we can neglect such purchases
in our formulation without loss of generality for the following reason. In perfectly
competitive and well-functioning two-settlement markets, forward transactions are
essentially used to hedge against the volatility of the RTP. Here, we consider
risk-neutral decision markers that deal with uncertainty by taking expectations.
Thus, in our setting, forward markets would bring no significant advantages to
any stakeholder. This justifies the reliance of the retailer in the RTP to purchase
electricity, which is an assumption that simplifies our exposition considerably.
4.2.2 Consumer Model
We consider M customers (indexed by i) who obtain a monetary benefit (i.e., gross
surplus) Si(qi, ωi) ∈ R from consuming a power profile qi ∈ RN throughout the
billing cycle. This benefit is contingent on ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ω
i
N) ∈ RN , where {ωik}Nk=1
is an exogenous random process that represents customer i’s local state. We assume
that Si is continuously differentiable in (qi, ωi).
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Accordingly, customer i exhibits a consumption profile qi = qi(T, ωi) when
facing a tariff T and a sequence of local states {ωik}Nk=1. Customers are rational in
that sense that the sequence of consumptions {qik(T, (ω1, . . . , ωk))}Nk=1 solves the
multistage stochastic program
csi(T ) = max
qi(·)
E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T (qi(ωi))], (4.1)
where the expectation is taken over ωi, and csi(T ) represents customer i’s expected
surplus. Correspondingly, a tariff T yields an (aggregate) expected consumer sur-
plus
cs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1S
i(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))
]
, (4.2)
where the expectation is taken over ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM).
Of particular interest is the demand response to tariffs T with constant gradient
∇T = pi ∈ RN , where pi ∈ RN is a time-varying per-unit price, such as the tariff
with the affine form T (qi) = A+ pi>qi. For such tariffs T we use the notation
Di(pi, ωi) = qi(T, ωi) (4.3)
for customer i’s demand profile, thus implicitly assuming that it depends on T
only through pi. Hence, Di is a standard demand function which we assume to be
nonnegative and continuously differentiable in pi, and its Jacobian ∇piDi ∈ RN×N ,
with (k, t) entry ∂Dik/∂pit, negative definite. Under the regularity assumptions
made on Si and Di, one can show that csi(T ) is decreasing and convex in pi
(see Prop. 5 in Appendix). We further define the aggregate demand function as
D(pi, ω) :=
∑M
i=1D
i(pi, ωi). A consumer model similar to the one decribed in this
section for N = 1 is proposed and discussed with more detail in [71].
For example, for a linear tariff T (qi) = pi>qi, the consumption of a TCL may be
modeled with a linear demand function Di(pi, ωi) = ωi − Gipi, with deterministic
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and positive definite Gi ∈ RN×N . Such demand function can be derived from
an additive and temporally-separable quadratic benefit function Si via stochastic
dynamic programming [69].
4.2.3 Retailer Model
We consider the case of a retail monopoly and refer to the single entity as the
retailer, utility, or load-serving entity (LSE). In procuring an aggregate demand
profile q =
∑M
i=1 q
i ∈ RN , we assume that the retailer incurs a variable cost λ>q,
where λ = (λ1, . . . , λN)
> ∈ RN is the wholesale RTP3 Hence, a tariff T yields the
expected retailer surplus
rs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1T (q
i(T, ωi)) − λ>qi(T, ωi)
]
, (4.4)
where the expectation is taken over the global state ξ = (λ, ω). For notational
convenience, we define the RS collected from the volumetric charge pi of an affine
tariff T (q) = A+ pi>q as φ(pi) = (pi − λ)>D(pi, ω) so that rs(T ) = φ(pi) +MA and
φ(pi) = (pi − λ)>E[D(pi, ω)]− Tr(Cov(λ,D(pi, ω))). (4.5)
4.3 Retail Tariff Design
In our retail tariff design framework, we assume that the regulator mandates the
retailer to choose a tariff T that maximizes the expected consumer surplus. More-
over, in order to recover the upstream fixed costs incurred to deliver electricity,
3While in practice the time granularity of the wholesale RTP is finer than that of retail rates,
we assume they are equal to simplify our exposition.
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the tariff should satisfy the revenue adequacy constraint rs(T ) = F , where F is a
target approved by the regulator.
Formally, the regulator’s problem can be stated as
max
T (·)
cs(T ) s.t. rs(T ) = F. (4.6)
Broadly, this problem falls in the category of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing and peak-
load pricing in economics [34], which are main components of the theory of public
utility pricing [19, Sec. 4.5]. See [141] for a recent overview of this problem in the
context of electricity pricing.
In this section, we study linear and two-part tariffs—two of the most widely
used tariffs in electricity industry. The restriction to two-part tariff can in fact be
made without loss of generality under certain conditions (Theorem 4.3.6). We be-
gin by making the following assumption that guarantees the existence and unique-
ness of solutions to problem (4.6).
Assumption 2 g(pi) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ)] is such that the Jacobian matrix
∇g(pi) is negative definite (nd).
This assumption—made mainly for analytical convenience—is common is eco-
nomics [71] and essentially imposes a limitation on the curvature of the demand
function4. Intuitively, the demand can be generally linear, concave, or convex in
pi; however, when convex, restrictions on the “amount” of convexity are required
for Assumption 2 to hold.
4In particular, for a linear demand D(pi, ω) = b(ω)−G(ω)pi, ∇g(pi) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)] is nd since
∇piD(pi, ω) is nd. Moreover, for a demand with additive disturbances D(pi, ω) = b(ω) +D(pi), A2
holds for pi ≥ λ if each Dk(pi) is concave in pi since ∇g(pi) = ∇D(pi) +
∑N
k=1(pik − λk)∇2Dk(pi).
Concave demand functions are common in economic models since they guarantee profit and
welfare maximization problems to be well defined [1]. See, for example, Prop. 6 in the Appendix.
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4.3.1 Structure of Optimal Two-Part Tariff
By restricting the regulator’s problem to two-part tariffs of the form T (q) = A +
pi>q, problem (4.6) can be reformulated as a convex program under Assumption 2.
We emphasize here that our analysis implicitly assumes that no customer chooses
to avoid the connection charge by not consuming electricity at all5. The following
result characterizes the optimal solution.
Theorem 4.3.1 (Optimal two-part tariff) The two-part tariff T ∗ that solves prob-
lem (4.6) is characterized by
pi∗ = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗, ω)(λ− λ)], (4.7)
A∗ = 1
M
(
F − φ(pi∗)) . (4.8)
Theorem 4.3.1 implies that the optimal price pi∗ is characterized by a period-specific
price markup relative to the expected RTP, λ. Examination of (4.7) reveals that
this markup is essentially determined by the cross-covariance between the price
sensitivity of demand and the RTP6 To gain intuition into (4.7), consider a demand
independent across time7, case in which
pi∗k = λk + εkk(pi
∗)−1Cov (εkk(pi∗), λk) , (4.9)
for each k = 1, . . . , N , where we use
εkt(pi) =
∂Dk(pi, ω)/∂pit
E[Dk(pi, ω)]/pit
(4.10)
5This assumption is widely accepted for services such as electricity and water since “it is
extremely unlikely that a customer will drop out of the market, however high the tariff” [19, Sec.
4.5]. Studies suggest, however, that more cost-effective DERs might challenge this assumption
in future years [114].
6In expression (4.7), the second expectation is a second-order expectation that can be thought
as the cross-covariance between a matrix and a vector.
7That is, a demand with Dk(pi, ω) independent of pit for all t 6= k
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to represent the (own or cross-time) price elasticity of demand at time k with
respect to the price at time t. The latter result resembles the (second-best optimal)
ex-ante two-part tariff derived in [71, Sec. 3] for the single period case (N = 1)8.
The expression (4.8) for the optimal connection charge A∗ also has an intuitive
interpretation. The first term corresponds to a uniform contribution towards the
retailer’s target F . And, the second term corresponds to a uniform preallocation
of the surplus that the retailer expects to collect from the volumetric charge pi∗,
φ(pi∗), which—as noticeable from (4.5)—may be positive or negative in general.
To gain additional insights into these results, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.2 If ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated, then pi∗ = λ and A∗ =
1
M
(
F + Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω)))
)
.
Corollary 4.3.2 indicates that T ∗ has a very simple and appealing structure
that resembles the result for the deterministic case where pi∗ = λ and A∗ = F/M .
Note that the assumption made in Corollary 4.3.2 is valid for many situations. It is
certainly true for demands that are not much affected by consumers’ local random-
ness9, such as the charging of electric vehicles and typical household appliances.
Even for loads from smart HVAC systems that are affected by random temperature
fluctuations, the assumption in Corollary 4.3.2 holds because the demand function
takes the form D(pi, ω) = ω +D(pi) [69].
As for the simpler structure of T ∗, it may not be surprising since the efficiency of
marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi∗ = λ) is a classical result for the deterministic case [19,
8Which also applies to the continuous time case where k ∈ [0, 1], the demand and prices are
deterministic, and demand is independent across time.
9More precisely, this assumption is satisfied by demands whose sensitivity to prices depends on
the customers’ set of appliances and idiosyncratic preferences rather than on random exogenous
factors affecting the wholesale prices, such as random temperature fluctuations.
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Sec. 4.5] [71]. Intuitively, marginal cost pricing is efficient because it induces
customers to increase consumption until the derived marginal benefit matches the
marginal cost of procuring electricity.
The expression for A∗ in Corollary 4.3.2 also has an intuitive interpretation.
While the first term remains unchanged from (4.8), the second term becomes a
risk premium associated to the cross-correlation that the demand and the RTP
may exhibit. When such cross-correlation is positive (as in practice [20]), the re-
tailer is likely to face additional variable costs since the expected variable cost
E[λ>D(λ, ω)] is larger than the variable revenue λ>E[D(λ, ω)]. Intuitively, this fee
represents a uniform risk premium that customers pay to face a deterministic price
rather than the volatile RTP. Presumably, the inter-customer cross-subsidies aris-
ing from the uniform allocation of this risk premium are negligible compared to the
differences. However, the integration of behind-the-meter renewables could make
these cross-subsidies worth adjusting, for example, through the use of discrimi-
natory connection charges consistent with the cost-causation principle described
in [106]. A discussion on cross-subsidies is held in Part II.
4.3.2 Structure of the Optimal Linear Tariff
A tariff of the form T (qi) = pi>qi—a linear tariff—is an ex-ante two-part tariff
with no connection charge. While such purely volumetric tariff may be simpler, it
has two fundamental disadvantages. First, a closed form expression of the optimal
linear tariff is not available under general assumptions. Second, such restriction
introduces a fundamental trade-off between the retailer surplus target and the
attainable social welfare. These drawbacks are noticeable in Theorem 4.3.3 and
Corollary 4.3.5, respectively.
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When restricted to linear tariffs, a unique solution to problem (4.6) can be ob-
tained due to Assumption 2. We characterize the optimal solution in the following
result.
Theorem 4.3.3 (Optimal linear tariff) Consider the regime where F is large,
i.e., F ≥ φ(pi∗). If feasible, the linear tariff T † that solves problem (4.6) is char-
acterized by
pi† = pi∗ − γ−1
γ
E[∇piD(pi†, ω)]−1E[D(pi†, ω)], (4.11)
or, equivalently, by
N∑
t=1
−εkt(pi†)
(
pi†t − pi∗t
pi†t
)
= γ−1
γ
, ∀ k = 1, . . . , N, (4.12)
where γ, the Lagrange multiplier of (4.6), satisfies γ−1
γ
∈ [0, 1] and is such that
rs(T †) = F . In this regime of F , the problem is feasible if and only if F ≤ φ(pim),
where pim is the price that maximizes rs(T ) over pi, which matches pi† as γ →∞.
In Theorem 4.3.3, expression (4.11) reveals that the structure of the optimal
linear tariff is characterized by a period-specific price markup relative to the price
of the optimal two-part tariff pi∗. The scalar γ−1
γ
∈ [0, 1], often called the Ramsey
number, adjusts markups in all periods uniformly to the point where the expected
retailer surplus matches the target F . A closer examination of (4.11), which can
be rewritten as (4.12), shows that the own and cross price elasticities of demand
determine altogether the markup for each period within the billing cycle.
To understand (4.12), it is informative to consider the case where the demand
is independent across time, namely, εkt(·) = 0 for t 6= k. In this case, the product
of the markup (pi†k−pi∗k)/pi†k and the own-price elasticity −εkk(pi∗) remains constant
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in time and equal to the Ramsey number. This means that periods with inelastic
demands get high markups and periods with elastic demands get low markups.
For this reason, this pricing rule is known in economics as the inverse elasticity
rule [19, Sec. 3.3].
Even simpler is the single period case, also derived in [71, Sec. 3]. Notably,
when N = 1, the scalar price pi† can be obtained directly from the constraint
rs(T †) = F , and it must be set so that it pays for the average total cost of the
procured electricity, i.e., pi† = (E[λ ·D(pi†, ω)] + F )/E[D(pi†, ω)].
A specialized application of this result was developed in [69], where a model for
TCLs under a day-ahead hourly pricing scheme was considered. In this case, the
demand function for each consumer is linear and the surplus function is quadratic
[69]. The aggregated demand is therefore also linear. The consumers as a collective
have a quadratic aggregated surplus [69]. Specifically,
Di(pi, ωi) = ωi −Gipi, (4.13)
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi) = δi(ωi)− 1
2
pi>Gipi. (4.14)
where Gi ∈ R24×24 is deterministic, positive definite (and symmetric). Letting
G =
∑M
i=1G
i and Ω =
∑M
i=1 ω
i and applying Theorem 4.3.3 readily yields
pi† = λ+ ρ
1+ρ
(pio − λ), (4.15)
where pio = G−1Ω induces E[D(pio,Ω)] = 0 and ρ = γ−1
γ
is the Ramsey number,
which is set so that rs(T †) = F . Intuitively, ρ varies within [0, 1] inducing prices
that vary between λ and the profit-maximizing price pim = 1
2
(pio + λ) as F varies
between φ(λ) and the maximum profit φ(pim).
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Figure 4.1: Pareto fronts induced by optimal linear and two-part tariffs. The slope
∂rs(F )/∂cs(F ) = −η relates to γ ≥ 1 in (4.11) through η = 21+γ .
4.3.3 Tariff Performance Comparison
We now discuss the performance of the derived tariffs in terms of social welfare
(expected total surplus) leveraging the graphical representation provided in Fig.
4.1. Therein, a Pareto front for each tariff illustrates the expected CS and SW
induced by the tariff for different RS targets F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)]. On one hand,
Theorem 4.3.1 has the following implication.
Corollary 4.3.4 As a tariff parametrized by F , the two-part tariff T ∗ induces an
expected total surplus sw∗ that is independent of F and cs(T ∗) = sw∗ − F .
In Corollary 4.3.4, sw∗ denotes the constant SW attained by the price pi∗, where
sw∗ = sw(T ∗) = cs(T ∗) + rs(T ∗). Implicit in this result is that for any affine tariff
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one can check that
sw(T ) =
∑M
i=1E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] (4.16)
depends on pi but not on A. Corollary 4.3.4 thus implies that under the tariff T ∗,
collecting additional revenue from customers to cover larger fixed costs embedded
in F reduces consumer welfare but does not compromise social welfare. This
“iso-efficient” trade-off between retailer and consumer surplus is illustrated in Fig.
4.1 with a linear Pareto front with negative and unitary slope in the cs-rs plane.
Intuitively, suboptimal two-part tariffs10 can achieve any point in the cs-rs plane in
the shaded area below the linear Pareto front in Fig. 4.1, but no ex-ante two-part
tariff can achieve points above this front.
Theorem 4.3.3, on the other hand, has a analogous implication.
Corollary 4.3.5 The quantities sw(T †) and cs(T †) induced by T † as a tar-
iff parametrized by F are decreasing and concave in F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)] with
sw(T †) = sw∗ and cs(T †) = sw∗ − F for F = φ(pi∗).
Corollary 4.3.5 reveals that, unlike the tariff T ∗, the optimal linear tariff T † compro-
mises not only consumer welfare but also social welfare when collecting additional
revenue from customers is required to cover larger fixed costs embedded in F . This
trade-off is depicted in Fig. 4.1 with a decreasing and concave Pareto front in the
cs-rs plane that bends away from the efficiency level sw∗ attained by the tariff T ∗
as F increases from φ(pi∗) until it reaches φ(pim). As before, suboptimal linear
tariffs can achieve any point in the shaded area below the curved Pareto front in
Fig. 4.1, but no ex-ante linear tariff can achieve points above this front.
10As the ones currently used by most utilities in the U.S., due in part to additional bill stability
and alleged equity concerns imposed by regulators.
60
From the previous analysis, it is clear that two-part tariffs dominate linear
tariffs in terms of expected consumer surplus in the regime of practical relevance
where F ≥ φ(pi∗). A natural question to ask is whether two-part tariffs can
be dominated by more complex nonlinear ex-ante tariffs. We now argue that,
under certain sufficient condition, the two-part tariff T ∗ is indeed optimal for the
regulator’s problem (4.6) among all ex-ante arbitrary tariffs. To establish such
result it suffices to show that T ∗ induces the same expected consumer surplus
that would be achieved by a social planner who makes consumption decisions on
behalf of customers with the unconstrained objective of maximizing the expected
total surplus. This is because the social planner’s problem provides a trivial upper
bound to the regulator’s problem.
Because we are interested in comparing ex-ante tariffs only, the social planner’s
problem should incorporate such implicit restriction. The restriction to ex-ante
tariffs translates into a restriction for the social planner to use only the information
observable by each customer i when choosing their consumption, namely their local
state ωi. Hence, the social planner’s problem can be stated as
max
{qi(ωi)}Mi=1
sw = E
[∑M
i=1S
i(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
, (4.17)
where the expectation is taken with respect to ξ = (λ, ω), and qi(ωi) is causally
contingent on (i.e., adapted to) the local state ωi. Finally, under the assumption
that each ωi and λ are independent, we show that the optimal solution to (4.17) is
qi(ωi) = Di(pi∗, ωi), which matches the demand induced by the optimal two-part
tariff. This result and the implied optimality of T ∗ are summarized in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 4.3.6 If (A2) the wholesale RTP λ and the local state ωi of each
customer i = 1, . . . ,M are statistically independent, then the two-part tariff T ∗ is
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an optimal solution of (4.6) among all arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
Theorem 4.3.6 indicates that the restriction to two-part tariffs may imply no
loss of generality. This applies—less generally than Corollary 4.3.2—for demands
that are not affected by consumers’ local randomness11, such as washers and dryers,
computers, and the charging of electric vehicles. For all the other cases, where
the sufficient condition (A2) does not hold, Theorem 4.3.6 sheds lights on the
performance of the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff T ∗. While it is clear that the
ex-ante restriction entails some efficiency loss when (A2) is not satisfied12, it is
not clear whether the restriction to two-part tariffs does entail efficiency losses.
In other words, is there a necessary condition for T ∗ to be an optimal solution of
(4.6)?
4.4 Numerical Example
We now estimate the performance of the optimal linear and two-part day-ahead
tariffs in a practical setting. Using publicly available data from ConEdison (New
York City’s largest utility) and NYISO for the 2015 Summer season, we estimate
the average daily gains in consumer surplus that both tariffs would have brought
relative to the utility’s default two-part tariff with flat rate. Here we assume a
linear demand model (4.13)-(4.14) and day-ahead linear and two-part tariffs.
The utility’s monthly residential energy sales13 and an estimated residential
11In other words, demands that, given a retail price vector pi, are independent from random
exogenous factors affecting the wholesale prices λ.
12This is because relaxing the ex-ante restriction enables the use of the ex-post two-part tariff
T (qi) = F/M + λ>qi which trivially achieves the maximum social welfare a social planner could
achieve (first-best).
13For June through August 2015, which can be found in the EIA-826 database at www.eia.
gov/electricity/data/eia826/.
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hourly load profile14 were used to obtain 2, 208 (92 days × 24 hr) aggregate hourly
consumption data points. We used these points as iid realizations {xj}92j=1 of the
random vector D(1pice, ω) = ω − G1pice ∈ R24, where pice is ConEdison’s flat
rate15, to fit G and then to estimate ω. Due to the its low-dimensional structure,
fitting G can be reduced to determining a scaling parameter after assuming certain
own-price elasticity of demand at pice16
ε(pice) =
∂E [D(1pice, ω)>1] /∂pice
E [D(1pice, ω)>1] /pice
=
1>G1
xˆ>1/pice
,
where xˆ denotes the sample mean of {xj}. While here we assume a value of
ε(pice) = −0.3, which is a reasonable estimate of the short-term own-price elasticity
of electricity demand [47], a sensitivity analysis over ε(pice) is presented in Section
5.3.4. We further assumed a total of M = 2.2 million of residential customers
and used ConEdison’s default residential connection charge, which amounts to
Ace = 0.52 $/day, to roughly estimate the utility’s average daily revenue from
residential customers as rev(T ce) = E[D(1pice, ω)]>1pice + MAce or $7.19 million
USD. As for the prices λ, we used the day-ahead prices for NYC as iid realizations
to estimate λ and Σλ,ω with sample mean and covariance estimators.
We plot in Fig. 4.2a the Pareto fronts
{
(∆cs(F ),∆rs(F ))
∣∣ F ∈ [φ(λ), φ(pim)]} (4.18)
induced by the optimal linear and two-part tariffs and three other relevant tariffs
that satisfy the revenue sufficiency constraint: an optimized linear flat tariff with
14For a residential building in NYC, available in the NREL OpenEI building load database
http://en.openei.org/datasets/files/961/pub/. The location/model with ID 725033-
TMY3-BASE was used.
15NYC’s residential default flat rate during Jun-Aug 2015 was pice = 17.2 cents/kWh (47.7%
of which correspond to supply charges and 53.3 to delivery charges). Available at www.coned.
com/rates/supply_charges.asp and www.coned.com/documents/elecPSC10/SCs.pdf.
16This is facilitated by assuming a homogeneous thermal parameter αi across customers, which
implies some loss of customer heterogeneity. See [69] for details of the model, where αi = 0.2 is
used in a case study.
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rate pif(F ), an optimized two-part tariff with fixed connection charge Ace and rate
pi†(F −AceM), and an optimized two-part flat tariff with fixed connection charge
Ace and rate pice + ∆(F ). The latter can be thought as ConEdison’s adjusted
tariff. In (4.18), ∆cs(F ) and ∆rs(F ) denote the surplus gains (losses if negative)
relative to the corresponding surplus achieved by T ce. For instance, for the optimal
two-part tariff ∆cs(F ) = cs(T ∗)− cs(T ce).
Fig. 4.2a compares the tariffs’ performances in consumer surplus gains for
different retail surplus targets. At ConEdison’s estimated net revenue level
F = rs(T ce), which corresponds to ∆rs(F ) = 0, significant performance differ-
ences can be observed among the computed tariffs. These differences are more
evident in Fig. 4.2b, which magnifies Fig. 4.2a around the origin. Due to its
nonzero connection charge, ConEdison’s tariff clearly outperforms the tariffs with-
out connection charges, but is outperformed by the other tariffs with connection
charges, which are further optimized. It is particularly interesting that switching
to the optimal linear tariff would bring loses in CS (−4.8% or −$345k USD/day).
Namely, by virtue of a connection charge, even a simple flat tariff can outperform a
fairly sophisticated day-ahead hourly volumetric tariff. Moreover, fully optimizing
ConEdison’s rate (but not its connection charge) brings rather limited CS gains
(1% or $72k USD/day). However, switching to the optimal two-part tariff would
bring significant gains in CS (8.1% or $582k USD/day). This corroborates how
effective connection charges can be at increasing the retailer surplus without sacri-
ficing economic efficiency. This optimal two-part tariff, which features a connection
charge of A∗ = 2.65 $/day or nearly 80 $/month, induces bill reductions for cus-
tomers 6.62% larger than the average customer and bill increments for all other
customers. Clearly, such charges may be politically unacceptable for low-income
customers and may require cross-subsidized reduced tariffs, which have been an
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industry standard [19, Sec. 7.4].
4.5 Conclusions
In this first part, we derive consumer-welfare-maximizing, revenue adequate, and
ex-ante linear and two-part dynamic tariffs from the perspective of a regulated
retailer. This initial analysis is for the case without renewables or storage in the
distribution system. Our results generalize previous works by deriving said tariffs
for a stochastic and multi-period demand model with intertemporal dependencies
and a predetermined lag time between the announcement of the tariff and the
beginning of the billing period. We established that if the wholesale prices and
each customer’s consumption are statistically independent, then the optimal two-
part tariff is optimal among the class of arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
While the optimal two-part tariff mitigates inefficiencies induced by the op-
timal linear tariff, inequity concerns inconsistent with cost causation arise from
the structure of the connection charge. These concerns may become significant
with the sparse adoption of behind-the-meter renewables. While tariff design cri-
teria beyond efficiency and revenue adequacy are out of the scope of our work,
it is worth mentioning that allowing discriminatory connection charges can give
flexibility to the regulator to achieve different objectives (such as inter-customer
cost-causation equity) and provide effective long-term signals (e.g., location within
the distribution network and investment in on-site generation) [106].
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Figure 4.2: Consumer surplus and retailer surplus gains induced by various tariffs parametrized
by the fixed cost parameter F assuming an intermediate own-price elasticity of
ε(pice) = −0.3.
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CHAPTER 5
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF CONNECTION CHARGES—PART II:
INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES4
Daniel Mun˜oz-A´lvarez and Lang Tong5
This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for dis-
tribution systems with distributed energy resources (DERs). Part I presents a
framework to optimize an ex-ante two-part tariff for a regulated monopolistic re-
tailer who faces stochastic wholesale prices on the one hand and stochastic demand
on the other. In Part II, the integration of DERs is addressed by analyzing their
endogenous effect on the optimal two-part tariff and the induced welfare gains.
Two DER integration models are considered: (i) a decentralized model involving
behind-the-meter DERs in a net metering setting, and (ii) a centralized model
involving DERs integrated by the retailer in the distribution network.
It is shown that DERs integrated under either model can achieve the same
social welfare and the net-metering tariff structure is optimal. The retail prices
under both integration models are equal and reflect the expected wholesale prices.
The connection charges differ and are affected by the retailer’s fixed costs as well as
the statistical dependencies between wholesale prices and behind-the-meter DERs.
In particular, the connection charge of the decentralized model is generally higher
than that of the centralized model.
An empirical analysis is presented to estimate the impact of DER on welfare
4This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-
1135844 and 15499. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2016 Information
Theory and Applications (ITA) Workshop in La Jolla, CA [85].
5L. Tong is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA. Email: lt35@cornell.edu
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distribution and inter-class cross-subsidies using real price and demand data and
simulations. The analysis shows that, with the prevailing retail pricing and net-
metering, consumer welfare decreases with the level of DER integration. Issues
of cross-subsidy and practical drawbacks of decentralized integration are also dis-
cussed.
5.1 Introduction
This two-part paper studies the design of dynamic retail electricity tariffs for dis-
tribution systems with distributed renewable and storage resources. We consider
a regulated monopolistic retailer who, on the one hand, serves residential cus-
tomers with stochastic demands, and on the other hand, interfaces with an exoge-
nous wholesale market with stochastic prices. In this framework, we analyze both
customer-integrated and retailer-integrated distributed energy resources (DERs).
Our goal is to shed lights on the widely adopted net metering compensation mech-
anism and the efficiency loss implied by some of the prevailing retail tariffs when
an increasing amount of DERs are integrated into the distribution system.
While Part I (Chapter 4) [87] establishes a framework to analyze the efficiency
of revenue adequate tariffs with connection charges, this Chapter (Part II) [88]
extends it to address the integration of DERs.
The main contribution of Part II is twofold. First, we characterize analytically
the optimal revenue adequate ex-ante two-part tariff for a distribution system with
renewables and storage integrated by customers or the retailer. We characterize
the consumer (and social) welfare achieved by the optimal two-part tariff under
both integration models. This analysis is an application of the classical Ramsey
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pricing theory [19] with extensions to accommodate the multi-period integration
of stochastic DERs. Second, we analyze a numerical case study based on empir-
ical data that estimates the increasingly larger inefficiencies and interclass cross-
subsidies caused by DERs when net metering tariffs with price markups are used
to maintain revenue adequacy. In this context, the derived optimal two-part tariffs
and a centralized DER integration model offer two alternatives to mitigate these
undesirable effects.
The main results of Part II are as follows. We leverage the retail tariff design
framework established in Part I (Chapter 4) to accommodate the integration of
DERs by customers (in a net-metering setting) and by the retailer in Section
5.2. The extended framework considers heterogeneous customers with arbitrary
behind-the-meter renewables and storage. Therein, we derive the optimal ex-ante
two-part tariff under both DER integration models and the combined effect of this
tariff and DERs on consumer and social welfare.
We find that under the optimal two-part tariff, DERs integrated under either
model bring the same gains in social and consumer welfare. This is in contrast to
prevailing volumetric tariffs under which the integration of DERs can increase or
decrease social and consumer welfare depending critically on the integration model
and the retailer’s fixed costs. Indeed, we demonstrate that the two-part tariff struc-
ture is optimal in the sense that no other tariff structure —however complex— can
achieve a strictly higher social welfare. This means that the two-part net metering
tariff of the decentralized model is optimal as a DER compensation mechanism.
These welfare effects are explained by the structure of the optimal ex-ante two-
part tariff. We show that under both integration models the derived tariff consists
of an identical time-varying price and a distinct connection charge. In particular,
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the time-varying price reflects the wholesale prices and their statistical correla-
tion with the elasticity of the random demand. The optimal connection charge
allocates uniformly among customers the retailer’s fixed costs and additional costs
and savings caused by risks and the integrated DERs. Indeed, while savings from
retailer-integrated DERs reduce the connection charge, customer-integrated DERs
induce slight increments or reductions caused by risks introduced by renewables.
The theoretical analysis of DER integration is complemented in Section 5.3
with an empirical study based on publicly available data from NYISO and the
largest utility company in New York City. The performance of the optimal ex-ante
two-part tariffs is compared with several other ex-ante tariffs for different levels
of DER penetration, under both integration models. Tariffs used as benchmarks
include the optimal linear tariff and two-part flat tariffs used extensively in practice
by utilities. In particular, relative to a base case with a nominal two-part flat tariff
and no DERs, we estimate the efficiency gains or losses brought by tariff changes
in Section 5.3.1. Subsequently, in Section 5.3.2, we estimate the efficiency gains
or loses brought by the integration of DERs under both integration models and
the various ex-ante considered tariffs. Most notably, our results estimate that the
efficiency gains brought by switching from flat to hourly pricing, which are below
1% (of the utility’s gross revenue) for most relevant cases, can be more than tripled
by a $10 increase in the monthly connection charge. Moreover, for the case with
customer-integrated DERs, we estimate in Section 5.3.3 the indirect cross-subsidies
that customers without DERs give to DER-owning customers due to net metering
tariffs with marked-up retail prices. All our estimations in this case study assume
a stylized model for thermostatically controlled loads.
Concluding remarks and proofs of the main results are included in Section 5.4
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and Appendix C, respectively.
5.1.1 Related Work
The literature on retail electricity tariff design is extensive, and there is an increas-
ing interest in addressing the integration of DERs. We briefly discuss works that
are relevant to our paper. Based on their main focus, we group these works into
two categories: (i) tariff design for fixed cost recovery with DERs, and (ii) optimal
demand response with DERs.
Tariff design for fixed cost recovery with DERs
The general principles used in retail tariff design are briefly reviewed in [111, 115]
and more extensively in [17, 141], and the additional challenges brought by DERs
are discussed in [32]. In the light of such challenges, current tariff design practices
and broader regulatory issues are being revised in comprehensive studies to address
the adoption of DERs [7, 8, 61, 90, 93, 120, 141], to estimate the impact of different
tariff structures on the bills of residential customers with solar PV [8], and to
investigate pricing issues related to the interaction between distribution utilities
and the owners of DERs [61]. .
Research efforts to study more specific issues of DER integration such as [36–39,
46,68,125] have also emerged. For instance, in [68], the trade-off between multiple
tariff design criteria is studied in a multi-objective optimization framework. An
analytical approach leverages a generation capacity investment model in [125] to
characterize sufficient conditions for RTP and flat tariffs to be revenue adequate.
More empirical approaches are conducted in [46], where interclass cross-subsidies
71
and revenue shortfalls caused by net metering tariffs are estimated, and in [39],
which estimates the impact of tariff structure and net metering on the deployment
of distributed solar PV.
Finally, there is an increasing volume of literature studying the “death spiral”
of DER adoption [4, 24, 30, 33, 74, 112, 114], which is presented as a threat on the
financial viability of utilities. This threat refers to a self-reinforcing feedback loop
of DER adoption involving a decline in energy sales and the persistent attempt
to recover utilities’ fixed costs by increasing volumetric charges. The empirical
analysis in [24], for example, models the effect that price feedback loops may have
on the adoption of solar PV and concludes that it may not be significant within the
next decade. In [4], an extensive list of factors that affect the system dynamics of
DER adoption is presented. It concludes that while the feedback loop is possible,
it is not predetermined and can be avoided. A stylized demand model is used
in [33] to argue that a minimum of price elasticity is required for the threat to be
an actual problem. The work in [114] provides an estimate of the evolution of the
lowest-cost configuration (namely grid only, grid+solar, or grid+solar+battery) for
residential and commercial customers to satisfy their load in the long-term for a
few U.S. cities.
There are still important gaps in this subject. For example, none of the works
above studies the efficiency loss and, with the exception of [46], the interclass
cross-subsidies entailed by the adoption of DERs under net metering tariffs. This
is precisely a focus of our work.
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Optimal demand response with DERs
Many works focus on deriving optimal retail pricing schemes to induce desired
electricity consumption behavior on customers with DERs such as [29,58,70,132].
For example, in [70], the authors consider customer and retailer integrated renew-
ables and storage separately in a setting similar to ours. They derive dynamic
linear tariffs that maximize an objective that balances the retailer profit and cus-
tomers’ welfare. Unlike our work, however, none of these works consider explicitly
a revenue adequacy constraint nor the use of connection charges.
5.2 Retail Tariff Design with DERs
5.2.1 Multi-period Ramsey Pricing under Uncertainty
Consider a regulator who sets a retail electricity tariff T in advance (ex-ante)
to maximize the welfare of M customers over a billing cycle of N time periods,
subject to a net revenue sufficiency constraint for the monopolistic retailer serving
the load. Expectations are used to deal with the uncertainties that naturally arise
when fixing a tariff in advance of actual usage.
To quantify the customers’ welfare we use the notion of consumers’ surplus,
which measures the difference between the gross benefit derived from consumption
and what the customer pays for it. Formally, we assume that given a tariff T ,
customer i consumes a profile qi(T, ωi) ∈ RN within the N -period billing cycle
contingent on the random evolution of the local state ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ω
i
N) ∈ RN ,
provided that qi is purchased from the retailer. Accordingly, customer i derives an
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expected surplus
csi(T ) = E
[
Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))], (5.1)
where T : RN → R and Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi) is the derived gross benefit. Collectively,
customers derive an expected consumer surplus cs(T ) = E[
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T )], where the
expectation is taken with respect to the M -tuple ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM).
Similarly, the expected retailer surplus or net revenue is
rs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1T (q
i(T, ωi))− λ>q(T, ω)], (5.2)
where λ ∈ RN is the profile of random real-time wholesale prices, q(T, ω) is the
aggregated demand profile, λ>q(T, ω) is the energy cost faced by the retailer, and
the expectation is over the uncertain evolution of the global state ξ = (λ, ω).
Adding the consumer and retailer surplus together yields the (expected) social
surplus sw(T ) = cs(T ) + rs(T ) which quantifies the social welfare induced by a
tariff T .
We can now formulate the regulator’s tariff design problem as the optimization
problem
max
T (·)
cs(T ) s.t. rs(T ) = F, (5.3)
where F is a constant representing the non-energy costs faced by the retailer that
need to be passed on to its customers1. As such, (5.3) is a version of the Ramsey
pricing problem2. In particular, we consider ex-ante two-part tariffs3 T (q) = A +
1F may include delivery, metering, and customer service costs, and it may also recognize that
a regulated firm should be allowed to earn some profit.
2Ramsey pricing is pricing efficiently subject to a breakeven constraint [19]. With (5.3), we
seek to apply Ramsey pricing to a single service with time-varying, random marginal costs and
temporally dependent stochastic demands.
3This restriction may involve no loss of generality (see Thm. 5.2.3 below).
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pi>q with connection charge A ∈ R and time-varying price pi ∈ RN . These tariffs
induce an individual consumption profile qi(T, ωi) = Di(pi, ωi), where Di(·, ωi) is a
demand function assumed to be nonnegative, continuously differentiable in pi, and
with a negative definite Jacobian ∇piDi(pi, ωi) ∈ RN×N that satisfies the following
assumption4.
Assumption 3 g(pi) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ)] is such that the Jacobian matrix
∇g(pi) is negative definite (nd).
In the following sections we accommodate the integration of DERs into the
tariff design framework above. To that end, we assume that either customers or
the retailer have access to distributed renewable and storage resources. We model
an agent’s access to renewables as the ability to use a state-contingent energy
profile r ∈ RN+ at no cost. Similarly, we model access to a storage with capacity
θ ∈ R+ as the ability to offset energy needs with any vector of storage discharges
s ∈ RN in the operation constraint set5
U(θ) =
{
s ∈ RN
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ −∑kt=1st ≤ θ, k = 1, . . . , N} .
We define the (arbitrage) value of the storage given a deterministic price vector
pi ∈ RN as
V s(pi, θ) = max
s∈RN
{
pi>s
∣∣∣ s ∈ U(θ)} , (5.4)
and let s∗(pi, θ) denote an optimal solution of (5.4).
4A detailed discussion on the implications of this assumption and special cases when it is
satisfied can be found in Part I [87].
5The lossless storage model defined by U(θ), which assumes no initial charge nor charg-
ing/discharging rate limits, involves no loss of generality since more complex storage models can
be accommodated redefining U(θ).
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In what follows, we focus on characterizing solutions to problem (5.3) consid-
ering DERs integrated either behind the meter by customers in a net-metering
setting or by the retailer.
5.2.2 Decentralized (behind-the-meter) DER Integration
Suppose that customers install renewables and a battery behind the meter. Let
ri(ωi) ∈ RN and si ∈ RN denote the energy customer i obtains from renewable
resources in state ωi and from the battery, respectively, and let θi ∈ R+ represent
its storage capacity. We operate in a net-metering setting where tariffs depend
only on di = qi − ri − si, which we use to represent customer i’s net-metered
demand. Hence, given a tariff T (d) = A + pi>d, customer i chooses consumption
qik and storage operation s
i
k at each time k contingent on ω
i
1, . . . , ω
i
k to solve the
multistage stochastic program
csi(T ) = max
qi(·),si(·)
E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T (di(ωi))], (5.5a)
s.t si(ωi) ∈ U(θi). (5.5b)
A key observation is that the linearity of two-part tariffs implies that customer i’s
problem (5.5) can be separated into two sub-problems: choosing qi(·) to maximize
E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)−pi>qi(ωi)]−A and choosing si(·) to maximize E[pi>si(ωi)] subject
to (5.5b). The former problem is equivalent to that of customers without DERs
analyzed in [87], whose solution characterizes the demand function Di(pi, ωi). As
for the second sub-problem, it is clear from (5.4) that s∗(pi, θi) is an optimal so-
lution. These solutions constitute an optimal solution to (5.5) and thus a net
demand function
di(pi, ωi) = Di(pi, ωi)− ri(ωi)− s∗(pi, θi). (5.6)
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This fundamental separation of the customer’s problem yields the following result,
where we use r(ω) =
∑M
i=1 r
i(ωi) and s =
∑M
i=1 s
i for notational convenience.
Theorem 5.2.1 Suppose that customers have access to renewables and storage
as characterized in (5.5) and (5.6). If ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated6, then
the two-part tariff T ∗dec that solves problem (5.3) is given by pi
∗
dec = λ and
A∗dec = A
∗ − 1
M
Tr (Cov (λ, r(ω))) , (5.7)
where A∗, the connection charge in the absence of DER, would be given by A∗ =
1
M
(
F + Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω)))
)
.
Before discussing some implications of Theorem 5.2.1, we examine the condition
that ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated. This condition holds in many situations.
In particular, it holds for demands that are not much affected by consumers’ lo-
cal randomness, such as the charging of electric vehicles and typical household
appliances. It even holds for smart HVAC loads that are affected by random tem-
perature fluctuations since their demand takes the form D(pi, ω) = D(pi) + b(ω),
i.e., a demand with additive disturbances [69].
The tariff T ∗dec in Thm. 5.2.1 reveals the following. Letting retail prices reflect
an unbiased estimate of the marginal costs of electricity (λ) maximizes social and
consumer welfare. Under net metering, this implies that the retailer should buy
customers’ energy surplus (from DERs) at the same price that he buys energy at
the wholesale market (in expectation).
The expression for A∗dec in (5.7) has an intuitive interpretation. It indicates
that the integration of behind-the-meter DERs would require adjustments to the
6The absence of decentralized storage makes this condition unnecessary.
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connection charge. These adjustments could be positive if the integrated renew-
ables tend to cause wholesale prices to drop (i.e., negative correlation), but they
could be negative otherwise. Consequently, these adjustments can increase or de-
crease the consumer surplus of customers without DERs because the former are
perceived by all customers as changes in their electricity bills.
The welfare gains brought by decentralized DERs depend critically on retail
tariffs. To assess the performance of two-part tariffs in this regard we first need
a point of comparison. In the absence of DERs, T ∗dec reduces to the optimal
ex-ante two-part tariff T ∗(q) = A∗ + pi∗>q derived in [87], where pi∗ = λ under
the assumption in Theorem 5.2.1. As a point of comparison, consider that in
the absence of DERs and under tariff T ∗, customers derive an expected surplus
cs0(T
∗) = sw∗0 − F , the retailer derives rs0(T ∗) = F , and social welfare is
sw∗0 =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)]. (5.8)
Corollary 5.2.2 Under the tariff T ∗dec, customer-integrated DERs induce an ex-
pected total surplus sw(T ∗dec) = sw
∗
0 +
∑M
i=1 V
s(λ, θi) +E[λ>ri(ωi)] that is indepen-
dent of F and cs(T ∗dec) = cs0(T
∗) +
∑M
i=1 V
s(λ, θi) + E[λ>ri(ωi)].
The expressions cs0(T
∗) and cs(T ∗dec) above characterize the tradeoff between
the retailer’s surplus target F and consumers’ surplus cs induced by the tariffs
T ∗ and T ∗dec, respectively. Indeed, noting the linear dependence of A
∗ in F , it
becomes clear that in both cases the rs-cs tradeoff is linear, as illustrated in Fig.
5.1. Moreover, the fact that the social welfare achieved in both cases (sw∗0 and
sw(T ∗dec)) does not depend on F implies that said tradeoff is not only linear but one-
to-one (i.e., the Pareto fronts in Fig. 5.1 have slope −1). This means that while an
increased net revenue target F +∆F decreases consumer surplus in expectation, it
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gain
Figure 5.1: Efficient Pareto fronts or rs-cs tradeoff induced by optimal ex-ante two-part tariffs
T ∗dec (solid line) and T
∗ (dashed line) with and without DERs.
does not decrease social surplus. Conversely, the integration of DERs behind-the-
meter increases both social and consumer surplus by
∑M
i=1 V
s(λ, θi) + E[λ>ri(ωi)]
in expectation regardless of the retailer’s net revenue target F .
Another implication of the optimal two-part tariff T ∗dec is the likely impact it
would have on the rapid adoption of behind-the-meter DERs. Prevailing tariffs
that rely on retail markups to achieve revenue adequacy provide an strong incen-
tive for customers to integrate Distributed Generation (DG). This is because, un-
der net-metering, the higher the retail prices, the more savings DG represents. By
eliminating retail markups and imposing virtually unavoidable connection charges,
T ∗dec generally reduces such savings. Hence, T
∗
dec is likely to decelerate the adop-
tion of decentralized DERs compared to the prevailing less efficient retail tariffs.
This suggests that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and the rapid adoption of
behind-the-meter DERs.
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Optimality of Net Metering
We have restricted the regulator to offer net-metering two-part tariffs. There are,
however, alternative mechanisms to compensate DERs that do not rely on net
metering (e.g., feed-in tariffs). We argue that the regulator cannot improve upon
the efficiency attained by T ∗dec with more complex ex-ante tariffs under certain
condition7. This holds true because T ∗dec induces the same efficiency attained by
the social planner, which provides an upper bound to the regulator’s problem
(5.3)8.
Theorem 5.2.3 Suppose that customers have access to renewables and storage.
If wholesale prices λ and customers’ states ω are statistically independent (i.e., λ ⊥
ω), then T ∗dec is an optimal solution of (5.3) among the class of ex-ante tariffs.
Namely, the restriction to two-part net metering tariffs, which are simple and
thus practical tariffs, imply no loss of efficiency if λ ⊥ ω. The latter condition,
however, makes the result somewhat restrictive as it applies to loads not affected
by customers’ local randomness such as washers and dryers, computers, batteries
and EV charging but not to HVAC loads or behind-the-meter solar and wind DG.
Nonetheless, said condition suggests that if the net load and λ are poorly correlated
(or either exhibits little uncertainty at the time the tariff is fixed) then T ∗dec may
have a good performance.
7The optimality argument in [87, Sec. III.C] without DERs applies to the case with retailer-
integrated DERs presented in the following section since both problems are equivalent except for
a difference in the parameter F .
8Due to the restriction to ex-ante tariffs, we restrict the social planner’s decisions to be
contingent on each customer’s local state ωi. This is because ex-ante tariffs cannot carry updated
information of the global state ξ = (λ, ω), unlike real-time or ex-post tariffs.
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5.2.3 Centralized (retailer-based) DER Integration
As an alternative to behind-the-meter DERs, we now consider the case where the
retailer installs DERs within the distribution network. To that end, suppose that
the retailer has access to a renewable supply ro(ξ) ∈ RN+ and a storage capacity
θo ∈ R+. Without loss of generality, we assume that the retailer determines the
operation of storage before the billing cycle starts (i.e., ex-ante)9. Assuming that
the retailer operates storage to maximize his net revenue, the resulting surplus
induced by a tariff T can be written as
rs(T ) = max
s∈U(θo)
E
[
M∑
i=1
T (qi(T, ωi)) − λ>(q(T, ω)− ro(ω)− s)
]
= rs0(T )− E[λ>ro(ξ)]− V s(λ, θo), (5.9)
The fact that the two last terms in (5.9) do not depend on T facilitates obtaining
the following result since both terms simply offset the surplus target F when
imposing rs(T ) = F .
Theorem 5.2.4 Suppose that the retailer has access to renewables and storage
as characterized in (5.9). Then the two-part tariff T ∗cen that solves problem (5.3)
is given by
pi∗cen = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗cen, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗cen, ω)(λ− λ)],
A∗cen = A
∗ − 1
M
(
V s(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]
)
(5.10)
where A∗, the connection charge in the absence of DER, would be given by A∗ =
1
M
(F − E[(pi∗cen − λ)>D(pi∗cen, ω)]) .
9Allowing storage operation to be contingent on partial observations of λ ∈ RN (say so(λ) ∈
RN ) only makes the maximum value of E[λ>so(λ)] over so(λ) ∈ U(θ) in (5.9) hard to compute
under general assumptions.
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We first note that, unlike Thm. 5.2.1, Thm. 5.2.4 does not require ∇piD(pi, ω)
and λ to be uncorrelated. However, if this condition is satisfied it holds that
pi∗cen = pi
∗
dec = λ. In other words, under optimally set ex-ante two-part tariffs, the
integration of DERs by either customers or their retailer do not require updating
prices to maintain revenue adequacy. Hence, in both cases, any potential feedback
loop of DER integration on retail prices (and thus on consumption) is undermined.
In terms of the connection charge in (5.10), the integration of DERs by the
retailer results in reductions relative to A∗. These reductions contrast with the
potential increments required by customer-integrated DERs (cf., A∗dec in (5.7)).
The underlying reason for such difference is intuitive, specially considering the
identical retail prices pi∗cen = pi
∗
dec. Decentralized DERs represent savings in volu-
metric charges for customers (with reduced net loads) whereas centralized DERs
represent savings in electricity purchases for the retailer. Because the latter sav-
ings cannot increase the retailer surplus beyond F , they are allocated uniformly
between customers through reductions in the connection charge.
Unlike with decentralized DERs in general, the welfare gains brought by DERs
integrated (and operated) by the retailer do not depend on retail tariffs. This is
formalized by the following result.
Corollary 5.2.5 Under the tariff T ∗cen, retailer-integrated DERs induce an ex-
pected total surplus sw(T ∗cen) = sw
∗
0 + V
s(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)] that is independent of
F and cs(T ∗cen) = cs0(T
∗) + V s(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)].
In Cor. 5.2.5, cs(T ∗cen) characterizes a linear one-to-one tradeoff between F and
cs induced by the T ∗cen. This tradeoff—equivalent to the Pareto front induced by
T ∗dec in Fig. 5.1—is characterized by the social welfare achieved by T
∗
cen, sw(T
∗
cen).
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Consequently, similar to behind-the-meter DERs, the integration of centralized
DERs increases both social and consumer surplus by V s(λ, θ0) + E[λ>r0(ω)] in
expectation regardless of the retailer’s net revenue target F .
The equivalent collective welfare effects of DERs integrated under both models
(characterized by Cor. 5.2.2 and 5.2.5) are in contrast to their individual welfare
effects. As suggested above, welfare gains (or losses) from decentralized DERs are
captured individually by DER-integrating customers as reductions in their bills
and as bill reductions or increments for all other customers due to the adjustments
to the connection charge A∗dec. This allocation of welfare gains constitutes an inter-
class cross-subsidy between customers. Conversely, welfare gains from centralized
DERs are uniformly captured by all customers as reductions in the connection
charge A∗cen.
Lastly, an implication of T ∗cen is the likely impact it has on the adoption of
DERs. The reduction in the connection charge characterized by A∗cen relative to
A∗ is the net benefit perceived by each customer due to the integrated centralized
DERs. Hence, customers should be willing to let the retailer integrate DERs even
if they entail capital costs that offset a portion of said reductions in the connection
charge.
5.3 An Empirical Case Study
In this section, we analyze a case study of a hypothetical distribution utility that
faces New York city’s wholesale prices and residential demand for an average sum-
mer day. We compare the performance of several day-ahead tariffs with hourly
prices at different levels of solar and storage capacity. Day-ahead tariffs with
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hourly prices are a particular form of ex-ante tariffs commonly offered in a vol-
untary basis for residential customers [72]. Tariff performance is measured both
in terms of welfare gains (or losses) and of the cross-subsidies induced between
DER owners and non-owners. We close our study with a sensitivity analysis over
the price elasticity of demand to demonstrate empirically the critical impact that
demand responsiveness has on the magnitude of the consumer surplus gains that
more efficient tariff design practices could bring.
Besides the optimal two-part tariff, we study other tariff structures with two
pricing alternatives (flat pricing or hourly dynamic pricing) and with daily connec-
tion charges fixed at various levels: zero, a nominal value reflecting Con Edison’s
connection charge, the nominal value plus 0.33 $/day (10 $/month), and the nom-
inal value plus 1.66 $/day (50 $/month). Similar tariff reforms are being proposed
in practice to solve utilities’ fixed cost recovery problem [141]. Given a tariff struc-
ture, we optimize the non-fixed parameters to maximize the expected consumer
surplus subject to revenue adequacy.
This case study uses the same demand model as in Part I [87], which comprises a
linear demand function and a quadratic utility function for each customer. We use
publicly available energy sales data and rates from Con Edison for the 2015 Summer
to fit the demand model. Con Edison’s default tariff for its 2.2 million residential
customers is essentially a two-part tariff T ce with a flat price of pice = 17.2 ¢/kWh
and a connection charge of 15.76 $/month (Ace = 0.53 $/day). We use day-ahead
wholesale prices for NYC from NYISO.
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5.3.1 Base case
This is the case without DERs and nominal tariff T ce. Throughout the case study,
we assume an average price elasticity of the total daily demand of ε(pice) = −0.3
at pice, which is a reasonable estimate of the short-term own-price elasticity of
electricity demand [11, 47, 79]. Moreover, we consider a total of M = 2.2 million
residential customers and use the tariff T ce to compute the utility’s average daily
revenue from the residential segment and the portion that contributes towards
fixed costs, which amount respectively to rev(T ce) = $7.19 million (M) dollars and
F ce := rs0(T
ce) = rev(T ce)− E [λ>D(1pice, ω)] = $5.83M.
For the sake of brevity, the details of these computations already described in Part
I [87] are not reproduced here.
We illustrate in Fig. 5.2a the expected retailer surplus (rs) and expected con-
sumer surplus (cs) induced by the revenue adequate tariff that maximizes the
expected consumer surplus within each tariff structure for different values of F .
For each tariff structure, the resulting parametric curve is a Pareto front that
quantifies the compromise between cs and the rs target, F . We plot these curves
as (possibly negative) surplus gains relative to the values induced by T ce, rs0(T
ce)
and cs0(T
ce) = $9.54M, normalized by rev(T ce).
We make some observations from Fig. 5.2a. First, the −1 slope of the Pareto
front associated to the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ corroborates that the induced
efficiency sw(T ∗) does not depend on F . Conversely, the larger the F , the more
inefficient the suboptimal two-part tariffs considered become. This can be seen
from the non-unitary slopes exhibited by all tariffs except T ∗. Second, at the nom-
inal rs target F ce (i.e., the horizontal axis), significant differences in the induced
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cs gains are observed among the tariffs. In particular, moving from flat prices to
hourly prices improves cs by approximately 1% ($72k/day). A more significant
cs gain (8.1%) is brought by also increasing the connection charge to the optimal
level (which amounts to A∗ = 2.65 $/day or 79.5 $/month). Conversely, decreasing
the connection charge to zero reduces cs by 4.8%. These empirical computations
suggest that additional fixed costs can be recovered more efficiently by increasing
connection charges than by pricing more dynamically.
5.3.2 Tariff structure and net benefits of DERs
We now analyze the combined impact of tariff structure and DER integration on
consumers’ surplus. We measure changes in cs relative to cs0(T
ce) and normalized
by rev(T ce).
Customer-integrated DERs
We start by estimating changes in cs as a function of the solar and battery storage
aggregate capacity integrated by customers. The tariffs here considered are ap-
plied to the hourly net metered demand, so they differ from existing net metering
tariffs with rolling credit. Moreover, we model the integration of renewable re-
sources using hourly solar PV generation data from a simulated 5kW-DC-capacity
rooftop system located in NYC10. Similarly, we consider the basic specifications of
a 6.4 kWh Tesla Powerwall battery11. We integrate as many of these systems as
necessary to reach the specified level of capacity.
10“Typical year” solar power data for the same months as temperature is taken from NREL’s
PVWatts Calculator available in http://pvwatts.nrel.gov.
11More precisely, a 3.3 kW charging/discharging rate and a 96% charging/discharging efficiency
are used.
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Figure 5.2: Normalized retailer surplus target v.s. induced consumer surplus gain (Pareto front)
for various tariffs in base case (i.e., no DERs).
In Fig. 5.3a we plot the Pareto fronts associated to three types of tariffs and
three decentralized solar PV integration levels. This figure is a zoomed-out version
of Fig. 5.2a computed for three DER integration levels. As such, it gives a rough
intuition of how decentralized DERs transform the Pareto fronts of different tariff
structures and, in turn, affect cs. In general, horizontal differences between the
Pareto fronts represent changes in cs due to tariff structure and/or to different levels
of decentralized DER integration, for certain F . Evidently, for any F , decentralized
DERs bring cs gains if the flat tariff structure is replaced by the optimal two-part
tariff T ∗dec. Conversely, cs losses are brought by the DERs for F = F
ce if the
adjusted flat tariff structure is kept, or if it is replaced by the “dynamic, nominal
A” structure. We quantify these changes in cs for F = F ce explicitly with the
following parametric analysis over the decentralized DER integration level.
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In Fig. 5.4a, for several tariff structures, we plot the normalized cs gains (or,
equivalently, the sw gains) caused by increments in the PV capacity integrated
by customers and the corresponding updates to the tariff required to maintain
revenue adequacy, i.e., rs(T ) = F ce. This case assumes that the storage capacity
integrated is half the PV capacity.
In particular, Fig. 5.4a shows how integrating decentralized DERs can trigger
both efficiency gains and losses depending on the tariff structure. For example, the
curve for the adjusted flat tariff T ce suggests that maintaining revenue adequacy
with flat rate increments would cause DERs to bring no significant net gains or
losses in cs and sw for small levels of integration. However, DER integration levels
beyond 500 MW would bring increasingly larger losses in cs and sw of 1.3% at 1.1
GW and 15% at 2 GW. A similar performance is shown by the optimal linear tariff
(dynamic pricing) with nominal connection charge Ace. The gain of 1% it exhibits
with no DERs vanishes to 0% at 1.1 GW of PV, becoming net efficiency losses for
higher levels of DER. The optimal linear tariffs with higher connection charges —
10 and 50 $/month larger than the nominal—, which bring initial efficiency gains
of 2.8% and 7.7%, respectively. While the gains of the former increase to then
decrease after reaching a maximum of 3.5%, the gains of the latter monotonically
increase reaching 13.6% at the maximum PV capacity considered, 2.2 GW. Other
example is the flat tariff with no connection charge, which starts with efficiency
losses of 6.8% that increase sharply up to 20.4% at 1.1 GW. Lastly, the optimal
two-part tariff starts with an efficiency gain of 8.2%, and it lets customer-integrated
DERs to generate their full value, which amounts to an additional 6.6% of efficiency
at 2.2 GW or 3% per GW. In other terms, the efficiency gains foregone by using the
adjusted flat tariff T ce rather than the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ increase linearly
with the level of DER integration and reach 29.3% (or $2.11 M/day) at 2 GW.
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In summary, connection charges embody a method for fixed cost recovery that
seems to be even more effective than dynamic pricing in the sense that it can
harness at least 90% of the efficiency gains attained by the optimal two-part tariff
for all the integration levels considered, whereas dynamic pricing alone can har-
nesses at most 12.5% and it generates efficiency losses for higher integration levels.
A word of caution on tariffs with high connection charges and lower flat prices,
however, is that they induce customers to consume more on peak, thus precipitat-
ing the need for network upgrades that increase the retailer’s fixed costs in a way
not captured by our model. This problem can be tackled using dynamic prices
and high connection charges to recover fixed costs, such as the optimal two-part
tariff, and more forcefully by considering endogenous fixed costs dependent of the
coincident peak net-load.
Retailer-integrated DERs
We now estimate changes in surplus as a function of the solar and battery storage
capacity integrated by the retailer. For the sake of a fair comparison, DERs with
the same characteristics as before are used.
In Fig. 5.4b, for several tariff structures, we plot the normalized gains in cs and
sw caused by increments in the PV and storage capacity integrated (in a 2:1 ratio)
by the retailer and the corresponding tariff updates required to maintain revenue
adequacy. The figure reveals that the DERs bring monotonic surplus gains under
all the tariffs considered. This is because the benefits brought by centralized DERs
are not offset by the consumption inefficiencies induced by decentralized DERs. In
fact, the inefficiencies induced by suboptimal tariffs without DERs are slightly
mitigated by centralized DERs because these DERs help the retailer recover a
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small portion of F .
Hence, Fig. 5.4b suggests that the changes in cs and sw brought by retailer-
integrated DERs are virtually unbiased by tariff structure. This is unlike customer-
integrated DERs whose effect on cs and sw is significantly biased by tariff structure
changes, and specially, by the reliance on retail price markups for fixed cost re-
covery, as it is evident in Fig. 5.4a. In other words, under tariffs with significant
retail markups, while centralized DERs generally bring surplus gains, decentral-
ized DERs tend to mitigate surplus gains or bring surplus losses. It also clear from
Fig. 5.4 that dynamic pricing and higher connection charges help consistently
(i.e., regardless the level of DER integration) to mitigate existing inefficiencies.
Notably, connection charges seem to offer a much more effective measure to miti-
gate such inefficiencies than dynamic pricing.
5.3.3 Cross-subsidies induced by net metering
Considering the inequity concerns raised by using net metering as a mechanism to
compensate DERs [15, 46] [120, Sec. 9.5], it is instructive to quantify the cross-
subsidies induced by the tariffs in the previous section. To that end, we compute
the cross-subsidies between PV owners and non-PV owners for different levels of
customer-integrated solar PV capacity.
For a given tariff structure and level of (decentralized) solar integration, the
cross-subsidy is computed by first obtaining the contribution that PV owners make
towards the fixed costs F . Similarly, the contribution that PV owners would
make under a version of the given tariff that settles consumption and generation
separately is also computed. This version, which is also optimized subject to
90
revenue adequacy, settles all consumption at the rates pi and all generation at the
prices λ12. Clearly, PV owners contribute less towards F under the net metering
tariff than its counterpart if the associated prices are marked up as a means to
recover the fixed costs F . We compute said cross-subsidy as the difference between
these two values, normalized by F . Intuitively, cross-subsidies are the difference
between the costs that each group should pay for and those they actually pay for,
due to net metering.
The computation of cross-subsidies requires specifying individual demand func-
tions and the distribution of solar capacity between customers. We consider a
simple illustrative case. Customers have identical demand functions except for a
scaling parameter σi satisfying σi = i · σ for some σ > 0. The 5-kW solar instal-
lations are allocated to the largest consumers, who have the greatest incentive to
invest in solar generation. The resulting inter-class cross-subsidies are depicted
in Fig. 5.5. Evidently, all tariffs induce non-trivial cross-subsidies except for the
optimal two-part tariff which yields virtually no cross-subsidy (in spite of the dis-
cussion in Sec. 5.2.2). This is not entirely surprising since pricing according to
pi∗dec = λ is efficient and consistent with cost causality. Hence, cross-subsidies with
such tariff happen only through the second term in (5.7) which is rather small com-
pared to A∗. The cross-subsidies of all the other tariffs increase with PV capacity,
and they do it at an increasingly faster rate for flat tariffs.
12Customer-integrated storage is not considered in this analysis because nonlinear tariffs make
customers’ problem fundamentally more complicated.
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5.3.4 Sensitivity of results to price elasticity of demand
We close this numerical study with a sensitivity analysis over the price elasticity of
demand to demonstrates the significant impact of demand responsiveness on the
potential benefits brought by more efficient retail pricing. To that end, we compute
new parameters for the linear demand model assuming different values for the
price elasticity of demand ε(pice). Details on similar calculations can be found in
Section 4.4. We analyze three different cases: ε(pice) ∈ {−0.2,−0.3,−0.6}. These
values reflect the estimates of short-term own-price elasticity of residential demand
surveyed in a recent report [91], where the low and high values (in magnitude)
indicate the range of reported values and the intermediate value—our base case—
is a central tendency proposed in the report.
In Fig. 5.6 we plot the Pareto fronts of three types of tariffs for each of the cases
considered. Similar to Figs. 5.3a and 5.3b, Fig. 5.6 depicts the way the own-price
elasticity transforms the Pareto fronts of three types of tariff. These transforma-
tions reveal the fundamental impact that the own-price elasticity has on the welfare
effects of price changes, namely, the more elastic the demand is, the more significant
the welfare effects become. This can be seen in Fig. 5.6 from the way the Pareto
fronts of the different tariffs get farther apart from each other more rapidly when
the demand is more elastic. For example, for F = F ce, the higher elasticity (−0.6)
changes the potential gains in consumer surplus and efficiency of switching to T ∗
from 8.2% to 16.2% and to 5.4% for the lower elasticity (−0.2). With this in mind,
one can revisit Figs. 5.3a and 5.3b to understand the impact of elasticity on the
welfare effects induced by DER integration. Broadly, the effects of DER integra-
tion on the relative efficiency of the tariffs would be either weakened or amplified
for more inelastic or elastic demands, respectively. More importantly, the relative
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inefficiencies introduced by customer-integrated DERs under tariffs that rely on
price markups for fixed cost recovery could grow alarmingly—i.e., more than in
Fig. 5.4—if the aggregate residential demand becomes particularly responsive to
short-time price variations, e.g., with the adoption of enabling technologies such
as home energy management systems.
5.4 Conclusions
We leverage the analytical framework developed in [87] to study how retail elec-
tricity tariff structure can distort the net benefits brought by DERs integrated by
customers and their retailer. This work is an application of Ramsey pricing with
extensions to accommodate the integration of DERs.
Our analysis offers several conclusions. First, while net metering tariffs that
rely on flat and higher prices to maintain revenue adequacy provide increasingly
stronger incentives for customers to integrate renewables, they induce increasingly
larger cross-subsidies and consumption inefficiencies that can outweigh renewables’
benefits. These significant inefficiencies have draw little attention in the literature
compared to the cross-subsidies. Second, net metering tariffs can achieve revenue
adequacy without compromising efficiency by using marginal-cost-based dynamic
prices and higher connection charges. These tariffs, however, provide little in-
centive to integrate renewables. Third, retailer-integrated DERs bring customers
net benefits that are less dependent on tariff structure, and they cause no tariff
feedback loops. As such, this alternative to behind-the-meter DERs seems worth
exploring.
This study represents an initial point of analysis, for it has various limitations.
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First, policy objectives beyond efficiency and revenue sufficiency —often consid-
ered in practice— are here ignored. Practical criteria such as bill stability make
“desirable” tariffs hard to be ever attained. Second, customer disconnections are
assumed to be not plausible as a customer choice. This assumption becomes in-
creasingly less realistic with the decline of DER costs. Lastly, retailer non-energy
costs are assumed to be fixed and independent of the coincident (net) peak load.
Relaxing this assumption leads to peak-load pricing formulations [34]. We discuss
one such relaxation in Section 6.2.1, where capacity costs are recovered with a
demand charge applied to the net demand coincident with the peak period.
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Figure 5.3: (a) Normalized retailer surplus target v.s. induced consumer surplus gain (Pareto
front) for various tariffs in base case (i.e., no DERs) and two cases with different
DER integration levels (10.12% and 20.23%) are compared.
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Figure 5.4: Expected gains in consumer and social surplus induced by (a) behind-the-meter solar-
plus-battery capacity and (b) retailer-integrated solar-plus-battery capacity under
different types of tariffs. Gains are measured relative to base case with tariff T ce and
no DERs.
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Figure 5.5: Cross-subsidy from customers without solar to customers with solar v.s. level of
behind-the-meter solar integration.
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Figure 5.6: Pareto fronts (parametrized by F ) induced by several tariff types and computed for
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CHAPTER 6
A CONTEXTUAL DISCUSSION OF RETAIL TARIFF DESIGN
WITH DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES
6.1 New York’s REV Initiative
In 2014, New York State’s Public Service Commission (PSC or the “Commission”)1
launched a comprehensive initiative aimed to “align electric utility practices and
[their] regulatory paradigm with technological advances in information manage-
ment and power generation and distribution” [95]. These developments “promise
improvements in system efficiency, greater customer choice, and greater penetra-
tion of clean generation and energy efficiency technologies, but only if barriers to
adoption are eliminated and proper regulatory incentives are established.”
This initiative, called Reforming the Energy Vision or REV, is proceeding on
two tracks that intend to address explicitly the following questions:
(Q1) What should be the role of the distribution utilities in enabling system wide
efficiency and market-based deployment of DERs and load management?
(Q2) What changes can and should be made in the current regulatory, tariff, and
market design and incentive structures in New York to better align utility
interests with achieving the PSC’s energy policy objectives?
While the research conducted in this thesis relates to both questions, it responds
directly to the latter. Accordingly, this section provides a brief description of the
main components of REV that relate to the first question and a more detailed
1This is the governing body that regulates electricity and gas utilities in NY State.
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examination of those related to the second question and to the issues examined in
this thesis.
The questions above were initially posed and addressed in a preliminary REV
proposal [92] elaborated by New York State’s Department of Public Service (DPS)
building on the Commission’s guidance. Therein, the policy objectives the Com-
mission is to pursue with the REV initiative are explicitly stated [95]:
1. Enhanced customer knowledge and tools that will support effective manage-
ment of their total energy bill,
2. Market animation and leverage of ratepayer contributions,
3. System wide efficiency,
4. Fuel and resource diversity,
5. System reliability and resiliency; and
6. Reduction of carbon emissions.
Building upon the initial REV proposal, a stakeholder process started and, since
then, several rulings and orders describing more concrete solutions to both ques-
tions have been produced. Among the most relevant documents that the stake-
holder process has produced so far since the initiation of this proceeding in April
2014 marked by the publication of the initial proposal [92] seem to be [93, 94, 96].
I now summarize and highlight some of the most relevant elements articulated in
these documents, in chronological order.
In February 2015, the Commission first issued an order adopting a regulatory
policy framework and an implementation plan (the “Framework Order”) [96]. The
Framework Order, which responds to Q1 (Track One), articulates a vision for the
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future of the electric industry in New York that leverages DERs to enrich customers
alternatives to satisfy their electricity needs. Perhaps the single most important
component of this vision is that it requires electric utilities in NY to provide dis-
tributed system platform (DSP) services that enable third-party providers of DERs
to create value for both customers and the system.
Broadly, facilitated by the utilities or DSP Providers, “products, rules, and en-
trants will develop in the market over time, and markets will value the attributes
and capabilities of all types of technologies. As [DSP] capabilities evolve, procure-
ment of DER attributes will develop as well, from a near-term approach based on
requests for proposals (RFPs) and load modifying tariffs, towards a more sophis-
ticated auction approach.” In particular, the services transacted in or by the DSP
will be of two types:
• “Distribution grid services that will enable the DSP to optimize the distri-
bution system, including through offsetting or deferring both immediate and
long-term costs”; and
• “Aggregated energy resources and ancillary services that can be sold to the
[NYISO] or through NYISO markets to optimize the generation and trans-
mission system.”
Subsequently, in July 2015, the DPS issued a staff white paper on ratemaking
and utility business models [93] (the “White Paper”) containing proposals for com-
ment and discussion. The discussion led the Commission to issue an order adopting
a ratemaking and utility revenue model policy framework [97] (the “Ratemaking
Order”) later in May 2016. The objectives of the White Paper, which responds
to Q2 (Track Two), were to (i) describe the limitations embedded in current tariff
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design practices in the context of REV, (ii) describe the direction of comprehen-
sive tariff design and business model reforms, and (iii) make recommendations for
near-term reforms where possible.
Following REV principles, the White Paper and Ratemaking Order discuss
three categories of reforms:
• Market-oriented utility business models,
• Incremental reforms to traditional utility revenue models, and
• Rate design changes to provide accurate value signals while meeting public
policy objectives.
Within the last category, which comprises reforms closely related to this thesis,
the documents suggest that future tariff design should consider the different types
of customers, namely,
• Traditional consumers, who do not choose to actively manage their energy
usage, or for whom it is difficult to do so;
• Active consumers, who integrate DERs that allow them to actively modulate
their usage in response to rate signals with the purpose of reducing their bills;
and
• Prosumers, who integrate DERs including generation or other technologies
that allow them to provide services to the grid.
The documents further suggest that tariff granularity should be developed along
the following dimensions:
• Temporal, by time-differentiating prices reflecting marginal price variations;
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• Locational, by “reflecting congestion or capacity constraints in pricing; for
example, locational marginal pricing or distribution locational marginal pric-
ing”;
• Attribute, by “unbundling rates to reflect the individual attributes embed-
ded in electricity service; for example, energy, capacity, ancillary services,
environmental impacts, or others”.
To guide tariff reforms under REV, the following tariff design principles are therein
adopted [97, Appendix A]: cost causation, encourage outcomes, policy trans-
parency, decision-making, fair value, customer-orientation, stability, access, grad-
ualism, and economic sustainability.
These tariff design principles reveal that under REV, while economic efficiency
is not listed explicitly as design principle by utility regulators, it is indeed pondered
(at the very least) through the cost causation principle. The cost causation princi-
ple embodies efficiency since the latter dictates that prices should reflect marginal
costs and connection charges should reflect costs independent of consumption. As
stated in [97, Appendix A], cost causation means that “[r]ates should reflect cost
causation, including embedded costs as well as long-run marginal and future costs.
Fixed charges should only be used to recover costs that do not vary with demand
or energy usage.”.
Moreover, the long list of tariff design principles mentioned above is clear evi-
dence that many criteria —not only cost causation and economic sustainability—
are balanced when setting retail tariffs. This is perhaps the most important differ-
ence between the analytical framework for tariff design analyzed in this disserta-
tion, which considers only efficiency and revenue adequacy2, and current ratemak-
2Utilities’ revenue adequacy is a form of economic sustainability for the distribution business.
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ing practices. Hence, our framework can be seen either as an analysis of ideal
tariffs (or better, minimally constrained “second best” tariffs) or as an additional
step towards more rigorous tariffs design practices.
Among the many proposals adopted in the Ratemaking Order, the following
are particularly relevant to this thesis [97, pg. 27]:
• “Opt-in rate design. Voluntary participation in advanced rate design will be
encouraged in two ways:
– Opt-in time of use rates. Each utility will examine its existing TOU
rates with reference to rates in other jurisdictions that have higher par-
ticipation; each utility will also develop improved promotion and edu-
cation tools.
– Smart Home rates. Utilities will collaborate with NYSERDA and third
parties to develop Smart Home Rate pilots.
• Large customer demand charges. “[Future] rate cases will examine the ex-
isting demand charges applicable to commercial and industrial customers to
determine if they can be made more time-sensitive.”
Of critical relevance to the integration of DERs is the Smart Home Rate (SHR)
proposed in the White Paper. While in the Ratemaking Order the SHR is only
discussed in the context of demonstration projects and early adoption, it is con-
sidered “the model for a rate design that should become the widely adopted norm
as markets mature”. As such, the Commission initiated a separate proceeding3
to establish a methodology to value DERs a path to replace Net Energy Meter-
ing (NEM), the current DER compensation mechanism. The SHR will combine
3Case 15-E-0751, In the Matter of the Value of Distributed Energy Resources.
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time-varying prices with a full value DER compensation mechanism, which will be
based on a formula of LMP+D (location-based marginal prices plus distribution
value) that represents the full value of DER on a time and location-specific basis.
The detailed specification of this DER compensation mechanism leads us to the
last REV document here discussed.
In October 2016, the DPS released a staff report and recommendations on the
value of DERs for public comment and discussion [94].4 Broadly, this report aims
to set the methodology to value DERs, design tariffs for DERs that compensate
their value, and replace NEM5. Among the many recommendations, the following
are particularly relevant to tariff design and DER compensation analysis in this
thesis:
1. Value of DER (VDER) compensation tariff.6 This tariff should compensate
only exported generation from DER projects at a time and location specific
rate that accounts for the following streams of value [94, pg. 32]:
• Energy value in a per kWh compensation based in the day-ahead NYISO
hourly LMPs.
• Installed capacity value in a “per kWh compensation based on the ca-
pacity portion of the utility’s full service market supply charges” for
intermittent technologies7, and in a monthly lump sum equal to the
4As of December 2016, the Commission has not issued an order acting on the recommendations
within [94] and the comments filed.
5The current NEM compensation methodology in NY is as follows. Customers’ “kWh usage
and generation is netted each [monthly] billing cycle; if their usage exceeds generation, they pay
only for the excess usage; and if their generation exceeds their usage, their excess generation
becomes kWh credits that offset their usage in the next billing cycle.”
6Or “Phase One tariff” as it is also referred to in [94] given that it is an “interim methodology”
to be replaced by a more definitive “Phase Two tariff” by December 2018.
7As commented in [94, pg. 33], this compensation recognizes that the otherwise more appro-
priate compensation suggested below for dispatchable technologies “would result in substantial
variability for intermittent technologies, which could present issues for project financing.”
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“MW performance [of the project] during the peak hour in the pre-
vious year multiplied by the actual monthly generation capacity spot
prices from NYISO’s ICAP [Installed Capacity] market that month” for
dispatchable DERs.
• Environmental value in a per kWh compensation reflecting the higher of
the applicable Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) NY market
price or the Social Cost of Carbon as calculated by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency.
• Demand reduction value in a monthly lump sum based on the project’s
kW performance during the ten highest usage hours in the previous
year within the utility’s territory multiplied by a time and location
specific marginal cost of service (MCOS) that reflects the value to the
distribution system of reducing demand during distribution peaks.
• Locational system relief value in a compensation similar to the previous
but applied only to projects in certain “high value areas” and for a
limited number of MWs.
2. Transition from NEM to interim VDER. This transition should differ across
DER project segments8 and be generally gradual and interim in the sense
that a more definitive and refined Second Phase tariff should replace VDER
in the next few years.
• Legacy projects. Existing DER projects should continue to be compen-
sated based on NEM for 20 years from the date of installation.
• On-site mass market projects. New projects should continue to be com-
pensated based on NEM until 2020 or a specified MW cap is reached
8DER project segments are on-site mass market projects, community DG projects, remote
NEM projects, and on-site large projects.
105
and face the Second Phase tariff thereafter.
• Community distributed generation projects. New projects should either
be compensated based on NEM (up to certain cap) or based on VDER
with an additional market transition credit (MTC) to be stepped down
in three batches over time.
• Remote net metering projects and On-Site large projects. New projects
not eligible for continuation of NEM9 should be compensated based on
VDER.
• Opt-In Availability. All DER projects that are entitled to continue
to receive NEM may elect to opt-in for compensation based in VDER
instead, but only until the Phase Two tariff becomes the default DER
compensation mechanism.
• Metering Requirements. In order to be eligible for VDER, all DER
projects except those in the on-site mass market segment must be
equipped with metering with hourly recording capabilities.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, while stylized, the frame-
work for tariff design and DER compensation developed in this dissertation sets a
theoretical basis that could be extended in different ways to capture more nuanced
models that could corroborate (or disapprove) REV tariff reforms and guide fur-
ther reforms. Clearly, a focus of REV is to move towards dynamic pricing which
is a premise in the proposed framework. A main challenge with the framework,
however, will be to deal analytically with tariffs that are applied to the net metered
demand and that are nonlinear in such quantity. The VDER tariff proposed in
9Some of these projects may qualify for NEM through previous Commission’s orders such as
the Remote Net Metering Transition Plan Order which may allow Remote Net Metering projects
to grandfather a remote net metering compensation methodology.
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REV is an example of a nonlinear tariff since the rate applied to the net consump-
tion generally differs from that applied to the net generation.
Second, the proposed framework can be made more compelling as richer struc-
tures of both the non-energy costs of utilities and the non-energy streams of value of
DERs are incorporated into the model. This should naturally lead to optimal two-
part tariffs with embedded charges explicitly associated to the different utility cost
and DER value attributes. This is precisely one of the objectives of REV, namely,
to increase tariff granularity not only along the time and location dimensions,
but also along the attributes embedded in the electricity service (e.g., capacity,
ancillary services, environmental impacts, etc.).
6.2 Limitations of the tariff design framework
In this section, two discussions related to the limitations of the analytical frame-
work developed in Chapter 4 and extended in Chapter 5 are held.
In the first part, we provide a discussion on the implications of relaxing the
assumption that the fixed costs to recover through retail tariffs are exogenous.
Therein, beyond a qualitative analysis of the possible implications, a simple exten-
sion to the mathematical tariff design framework that embodies such relaxation is
presented along with its likely implications on the structure of the optimal two-part
tariff.
In the second part, we discuss the nuanced trade-off that the exists between
ex-ante and ex-post tariffs (or tariff attributes, for that matter). Therein, we
briefly describe some of the practical arguments that favor price certainty over
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price accuracy.
6.2.1 Endogenous distribution costs
Clearly, it is unrealistic to assume that the delivery costs10 faced by distribution
utilities to serve electricity demand are generally fixed. This is because distribution
networks need to be expanded or adapted to cope with peak (net) loads and flow
patterns that change gradually in the long run.
In economics, the notion of fixed costs refers broadly to expenses that do not
depend on the level of good or services provided. To be meaningful, however,
this notion must be associated to a time horizon since there exist virtually no
costs that are truly fixed in the the long run. Hence, while it may be reasonable to
assume that distribution utilities’ delivery costs are fixed in the short run (e.g., the
next day), it is certainly not realistic to do so in the long run (e.g., the next
month, season, or year). A concrete example of these costs are the charges for
installed generation capacity (ICAP) imposed by ISOs to distribution utilities11.
For example, the “NYISO requires utilities to purchase capacity [on a monthly
basis] based on the MW usage on their system during the statewide peak hour of
the previous year.” [94].
In the industry, the notion of fixed costs permeates retail tariff design practices
in a way that is illustrated by the following text: “there is little controversy over the
principle that fixed charges should recover only costs that are invariable with usage;
but parties disagree strongly as to which types of delivery system costs fall into
the invariable category.” [97, pg. 122] Indeed, on the one hand, many distribution
10As opposed to supply or energy costs.
11or Load Serving Entities (LSEs), to be more accurate.
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utilities in the U.S. have been proposing increases in fixed or connection charges
for all residential customers12 as a practical means to resolve the potential fixed
cost recovery problem and financial threat embodied by DERs articulated in [74].
On the other hand, DER developers and consumer advocate against the use of
connection charges for fixed cost recovery based arguing, among other things, that
they provide no useful incentives, are a short-term practical solution for a long-
run problem that has not yet been materialized in practice, have disproportionate
impacts on low-income customers, and may unfold peak-load increments [73,138].
Other perspectives on fixed costs (and other tariff attributes/structures) as a means
to resolve the fixed cost recovery problem can be found in [141].
In general, DERs have the potential to rapidly change usage patterns of the
distribution network. In particular, they have the potential to not only shift the
magnitude and time of system-wide and circuit-specific load peaks but also to
induce circuit-specific generation or export peaks in the opposite flow direction.
Research shows that the system-wide and circuit-specific changes in usage patterns
can entail additional capital expenditures (see e.g., [120]). Indeed, studies argue
that to realize their full value, DERs must be included in distribution planning
and operation, just as central generation resources are included in transmission
planning and operation [48].
As an alternative or complement to DER integration based on centralized dis-
tribution planning and operation, DER investment may be guided by more precise
and granular tariffs or other market mechanisms that better compensate the value
streams DERs offer. This is precisely the alternative currently pursued by the NY
REV initiative [94].
12“In 2015, 61 utilities in 30 states proposed increasing monthly fixed charges on all residential
customers by at least 10%. The median increase requested in these cases was 62%.” [67]
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In particular, the DER benefits and costs depend critically on their operation,
sizing, and spatial distribution within the network. On one the hand, the real-time
operation of DERs, if controllable to any extent, involves short run decisions that
can be shaped through price signals that better reflect the marginal short run costs
avoided by each particular DER to the system as a whole, thereby increasing their
short run value and the ability of customers to monetize it. As argued above, this
can be done by increasing the granularity of the prices faced by DER operators.
On the other hand, the size and spatial distribution of DERs is the result of long
run investment decisions that can be shaped through tariffs structures that better
reflect the marginal long run system costs avoided by DERs. Such tariffs can thus
increase the long run value of DERs and customers’ ability to monetize it. This can
be done, for instance, by unbundling volumetric charges faced by DER operators
into tariffs with multiple attributes that reflect transparently the location-specific
costs of energy, capacity, and ancillary services.
To give an idea of how refining or unbundling the structure of the delivery costs
faced by distribution utilities13 can have an impact on retail tariffs we present the
following analysis. The tariff design framework developed in Chapters 4 and 5
models delivery costs with an exogenous parameter F ∈ R that assumes such costs
are entirely fixed (i.e., not dependent on net load). Here, we refine the structure of
delivery costs by adding a linear capacity cost β (in $/MW ). We assume that the
retailer has to pay for the maximum capacity (measured in MW ) used collectively
by its customers during the billing period, namely, their customers’ noncoincident
peak demand. This is different from the retailer’s customers’ coincident peak
demand, which refers to their aggregated (net) load during the time of peak demand
13Or, more generally, the structure of the total costs faced by retailers, which may also incor-
porate generation ICAP costs as those mentioned above.
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across the entire system (e.g., NYISO’s service territory)14. While the latter charge
(based on coincident demand) is closer to the current practice in U.S. wholesale
markets, the former (based in noncoincident demand) allows for a notationally
cleaner mathematical formulation.
One way to incorporate such capacity costs into the regulator’s problem (4.6) is
to use an auxiliary decision variable K(ω) ∈ R to represent the maximum capacity
used by customers during the billing cycle contingent on the state ω. One can then
subtract the expected capacity cost
E[βK(ω)] (6.1)
to the left hand side of the budget constraint of problem (4.6) (i.e., to the retailer’s
surplus rs(T )) and add the capacity constraints
dk(ω) ≤ K(ω), k = 1, . . . , N, (6.2)
where dk(ω) =
∑M
i=1 d
i
k(ω
i) represents the aggregate net demand at time k.
This type of capacity costs have been addressed in the literature of retail tar-
iff design but only in settings without DERs. Indeed, this problem is generally
known in economics as the peak-load pricing problem15, and it has been widely
studied with many different variations not including the integration of DERs. Sev-
eral models of such classical problem are studied and generalized in [109] in the
absence of demand uncertainties. Demand uncertainty complicates the analysis
considerably when accompanied with an ex-ante capacity constraint16 due to the
need to model (the cost of) rationing inelastic demand. According to the survey of
14We further assume that a retailer’s customers’ maximum usage of the system’s capacity is
due to their net consumption and not to their net generation, which seems rather unlikely in
current systems.
15Broadly, this problem can be thought as an specialization of the Ramsey pricing problem to
a single good that is supplied over multiple time periods.
16This is in contrast to the ex-post capacity constraint in (6.2).
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the peak-load pricing problem in [34], while the original Boiteux work [9] modeled
a stochastic demand, most of the contributions in the treatment of stochastic de-
mand came later after the seminal work by Brown and Johnson [18]. For example,
the subsequent work [35] extended the stochastic model to incorporate multiple
supply technologies and time periods whereas [25] further incorporates supply-side
uncertainties. Works that may have more relevance to the integration of DERs
are the extensions to deal with centralized storage discussed in [56, 98] and with
stochastic demands with price interdependencies across a continuous time horizon
in [105].
We now analyze the more general formulation of (4.6) with (6.1) and (6.1) by
conveying a basic intuition of the resulting optimal two-part tariff that is valid
for the case with deterministic demand and prices. The idea is to leverage the
existing literature on peak-load pricing to build such intuition. To that end, we
first make the analysis without DERs, and then we accommodate customer and
retailer-integrated DERs leveraging the linearity of the two-part net metering tariff.
The intuition is as follows. The analysis in [109] suggests that in the absence of
uncertainties and DERs, when both the revenue adequacy and capacity constraints
are considered modeled, the optimal linear tariff T †(q) = pi†>q should depend on
the wholesale prices λ, the marginal cost of capacity β, the fixed costs F , and the
own and cross price elasticities of demand at pi†. Moreover, in deriving the optimal
two-part tariff T ∗(q) = A∗ + pi∗>q, the additional degree of flexibility given by the
uniform connection charge A∗ essentially allows one to drop the revenue adequacy
constraint. This is because A∗ can be set arbitrarily to make T ∗ revenue adequate.
This implies that the price pi∗ of the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ should depend on
λ, β, and possibly on the price elasticities of demand at pi∗, but not on F . We
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argue below that pi∗ reflects both λ and β in a way equivalent to a tariff with a
volumetric charge reflecting λ and a demand charge applied to the demand at the
retailer’s coincident peak period that reflects β.
Before giving a more detailed explanation of this intuitive result, we summarize
the previous discussion as follows. Incorporating capacity costs into the structure
of the delivery costs faced by the retailer yields an optimal two-part tariff that
resembles a three-part tariff with
• volumetric charges reflecting marginal energy costs λ,
• a connection charge reflecting fixed costs F , and
• a demand charge reflecting the marginal capacity cost β.
We now give a more detailed explanation of this result. In [109], it is shown
that in the absence of the revenue adequacy constraint, the optimal price is set
according to marginal-cost pricing principles. This means that the net-metered
demand at the peak period p = arg maxk{dk(T )} is charged for both the marginal
cost of energy λp and the marginal cost of capacity β whereas off-peak demand is
charged only for the marginal cost of energy, i.e., for each k = 1, . . . , N ,
pi∗k =

λk + β, k = p,
λk, k 6= p.
(6.3)
This expression assumes the simpler case where the peak net load is attained at a
single time period. If the peak net load is attained at two or more periods then
the marginal cost of capacity would be split somehow between the peak periods.
In theory, this is likely to occur if β is large enough (relative to λ) and the demand
elastic enough. In such case, the problem really becomes determining endogenously
which are the peak periods, which renders difficult the computation of pi∗.
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With an expression for pi∗, the optimal connection charge A∗ can be then com-
puted appropriately by solving for A the (now deterministic) revenue adequacy
constraint rs(T ) = F + βK or
M∑
i=1
pi∗>Di(pi∗) + A− λ>Di(pi∗) = F + βDp(pi∗)
which ultimately yields
A∗ = F/M. (6.4)
This result could be extended to the case with customer and retailer-integrated
DERs with arguments similar to Theorems 5.2.1 and 5.2.4. It should be the case
that the optimal price pi∗ is not affected by the integration of DERs regardless of
who integrates them, i.e.,
pi∗dec = pi
∗ and pi∗dec = pi
∗.
Consequently, leveraging on the expressions for A∗dec in (5.7) and A
∗
cen in Theorem
5.2.4, the optimal connection charges under both integration models and without
uncertainty would be given by
A∗dec = A
∗ (6.5)
A∗cen = A
∗ − 1
M
(
V s(pi∗, θo) + λ>ro
)
. (6.6)
Notably, this relies on the expression (6.3) for pi∗ which conveniently assumes that
the peak load occurs at a single time period.
6.2.2 Ex-ante vs. ex-post retail tariffs
In general, retail tariffs can be fixed in advance of the beginning of each billing
cycle, at the beginning of each cycle, during each billing cycle, or even after the
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billing cycle. More generally, the attributes that constitute a tariff can be fixed
separately (i.e., not a the same time) before, at, or even after the beginning of the
time interval (within the billing cycle) for which they are valid.
Consider for example the traditional ratemaking process followed in the U.S.
by which electric utilities set the tariffs or “rates” they will charge customers of
different classes. The main structure and most of the attributes of all tariffs are
fixed through rate case proceedings several months in advance of the beginning
of the period for which they remain valid, which often comprises several years17.
These tariffs are typically applied or settled in monthly billing cycles, and, de-
pending on the capabilities of the installed meter (e.g., cumulative, time-of-day,
real-time), they can specify time-varying prices for more granular time intervals.
Moreover, the attributes of these tariffs that reflect delivery costs (e.g., network
costs) tend to remain unchanged over until the next rate case proceeding. In con-
trast, the tariff attributes that reflect supply or energy charges tend to be updated
more frequently. An example of these rates are the “energy delivery charges” and
the “market supply charges” embedded in Con Edison’s default flat tariff for resi-
dential customers in NYC, which are respectively updated on rate cases every few
years and every month.
In a sense, the trade-off between ex-ante and ex-post tariffs is between greater
advanced price notification and more accurate prices. There is a relevant discussion
on this trade-off in [14, Sec. I.C.1] in the context of real-time pricing (RTP) and
time-of-use (TOU) tariffs. The authors argue that, on the one hand, “a longer lag
time between the price announcement and the price implementation will result in
prices that less accurately reflect the actual real-time supply/demand situation in
the market.” Moreover, “the longer lag time means that the prices will be less
17Typically, annual updates are also conducted to incorporate updated forecasts.
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BASE STRUCTURES  
Any time-based volumetric rate design will have one of these structures as  
a foundation
While not a time-based rate on its own, a flat volumetric 
rate—including inclining block rates—can be considered 
time-based when coupled with a time-based modification 
(see right).   
A time-of-use (TOU) structure reflects historical temporal 
variation in system costs by differentiating prices by time 
of day. Both prices and their applicable time period are 
predetermined.
A real-time pricing (RTP) structure provides prices that vary 
over short intervals (e.g., hourly) to closely (or exactly) reflect 
actual costs. Prices are not predetermined.
MODIFICATION OPTIONS  
These mechanisms can be added to a base structure to increase rate 
sophistication without moving to a more complex base structure
Critical peak (CP) mechanisms charge customers higher prices 
or provide a rebate for a limited number of days each year, 
when system costs are highest.* The price is predetermined, as 
are the allowable time periods, but the actual peak events are 
finalized a few hours to a day in advance.
Variable peak (VP) mechanisms apply variable pricing 
or rebates to peak periods.** In VP, the peak periods 
are predetermined but the price can vary, for example, 
according to wholesale prices or reliability needs.
A flexible duration (FD) mechanism can be added to a 
CP or VP program, and uses peak periods that are not 
predetermined—this is intended to create a closer match 
between the actual timing of peak system costs and the 
signal sent to customers.
* Common implementations include critical peak pricing (CPP) and critical peak rebates (CPR), also known as peak time rebates (PTR). 
** Common implementations include variable peak pricing (VPP) and variable peak rebates (VPR).
02: RESEARCH INSIGHTS: TIME-BASED RATES
Time-based rates are built upon one of three 
structures, which may then be modified further
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RTP +FD
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02: RESEARCH INSIGHTS: TIME-BASED RATES
These structures and modifications produce an 
array of time-b sed r t  designs that increase 
sophistication from traditional flat rates
THE VARIOUS TIME-BASED RATE OPTIONS INTRODUCE DIFFERENT 
LEVELS OF TEMPORAL GRANULARITY AND PRICE UNCERTAINTY:
HOURLY
Prices change 
every hour
NONE
Prices do not 
vary by time
MINIMAL
Customers have complete 
knowledge of prices as much as 
years ahead of time
SIGNIFICANT
Prices are unknown to the 
customer until shortly before the 
moment of consumption 
PRICE UNCERTAINTY
How far in advance do customers 
know what the price will be for a 
given time?
TEMPORAL 
GRANULARITY
How do prices 
vary by time?
FLAT
TOU
RTP
+VP
+VP
+VP
+VP
+FD+FD+FD
+CP
+CP
+CP
+CP
+CP
TOUTOU
TOUTOU
TOU
FLAT
TOU
(b)
Figure 6.1: (a) Time-based rates used in practice and (b) comparison in temporal granularity
vs. price uncertainty (Source: Rocky Mountain Institute [31])
volatile than, for instance, the real-time wholesale electricity price.” This suggests
that setting prices ex-ante implies at least:
1. More certainty and time for customers to optimize consumption;
2. A shift of the risk of facing the RTP to retailers;
3. A limitation to reflect accurately the variation of wholesale prices.
In Fig. 6.1, taken from [31], several time-based tariffs are compared in two dimen-
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sions: temporal granularity vs. price uncertainty. In other words, ex-ante prices
facilitate customers’ decision making but limit the effectiveness of prices to carry
updated centralized information to coordinate decentralized decisions in real-time.
According to [14], “the cost of this loss of information will depend very much on
how customers would react if they were given the finer information.” The example
the authors give is instructive [14, pg. 14]:
“For instance, if a factory can react to price changes only by mak-
ing long-term adjustments, such as changing worker shift schedules
that can be made only semi-annually, then the information in TOU
prices may be all that the factory can use. In that case, no price-
responsiveness is being sacrificed in using TOU prices instead of RTP.
On the other hand, if the customer can make such adjustments more
frequently, such as weekly or monthly, or can adjust quickly to idiosyn-
cratic supply/demand information, such as by adjusting air condition-
ing settings and lighting when the system is strained, TOU rates fail
to send the information that the customer needs to make these adjust-
ments.”
The authors make a final point emphasizing the fundamental impact of technol-
ogy on this trade-off: “technology changes have also enhanced, and continue to
enhance, the customer’s ability to respond to real-time price changes.” Indeed,
the communication between smart meters and energy managements systems re-
duce the need of human intervention. This, in turn, reduces the transaction costs
involved in monitoring price profile updates and in optimizing consumption18, and
increases price-responsiveness.
18See [71, Sec. 3] for a discussion on these transaction costs.
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There is another case in which certainty may not compromise efficiency signif-
icantly by losing accuracy. This is the case of the “Value of DER” tariff proposed
to compensate DER under NY’s REV initiative. There is an attribute of this tariff
that compensates for the generation capacity that DERs provide to the system.
The following segment of the report [94] makes a clear argument:
“The [Value of DER] tariff could base compensation for installed ca-
pacity on this value by compensating eligible generation facilities each
month with a lump sum equal to their MW performance during the
peak hour in the previous year multiplied by the actual monthly gen-
eration capacity spot prices from NYISO’s ICAP market that month.
However, this would result in substantial variability for intermittent
technologies, which could present issues for project financing.”
Recognizing this challenge, the report recommends a compensation methodology
based on a “typical” technology-specific generation profile that mitigates entirely
the excessive uncertainty entailed by a mechanism under which the 12 monthly
payments for capacity of any year would depend on entirely on the generation
exported during a single hour of the previous year.
In conclusion, when designing tariffs, there is a trade-off between longer lag
times and price accuracy. This trade-off is difficult to capture in part because
it involves two aspects of consumer behavior that are challenging to model or
measure. These aspects are customers’ risk preferences and the trade-off they face
between the transaction costs involved in reacting to dynamic prices19 and the
potential bill savings they may achieve by doing so.
19Customers may face significant transaction costs to act timely upon complex and ex-post
tariffs. Alternatively, they face the costs of technologies such as energy management systems
that can mitigate such transactions costs.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3
Let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium throughout. And, let
(λ(k), γ(k),µ(k),νi,νi) denote the corresponding Lagrange multipliers satisfying
the KKT conditions (2.6)-(2.13) for all k and i. We prove the desired result by
establishing nonnegativity of both the TCS and SCS. 
Proposition 1 TCS =
∑N−1
k=0 µ(k)
>c ≥ 0.
Proof. We have that TCS = −∑N−1k=0 λ(k)>(v(k) + u(k)) based on its definition
in (2.16). Substituting for λ(k) according to Equation (2.8), and using the fact
that 1>(v(k) + u(k)) = 0 for all k, we have that
TCS =
N−1∑
k=0
µ(k)>H(v(k) + u(k)).
The complementary slackness condition (2.11) yields TCS =
∑N−1
k=0 µ(k)
>c, which
is clearly nonnegative. 
Proposition 2 SCS =
∑n
i=1 ν
>
i bi ≥ 0.
Proof. We have that SCS =
∑n
i=1 λ
>
i ui based on its definition in (2.17). A di-
rect substitution of the stationarity condition (2.10) and complementary slackness
conditions (2.12)-(2.13) yields
SCS =
n∑
i=1
ν>i Lui − ν>i Lui =
n∑
i=1
ν>i bi,
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which is clearly nonnegative. 
The desired result follows from Propositions 1 and 2, as MS = TCS + SCS.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.9
Let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium throughout. Clearly, the maxi-
mum rent achievable by any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission rights
is given by the optimal value of
maximize Φ(T ,F) (A.1)
subject to t(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (A.2)
qi ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n. (A.3)
This is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints in the decision vari-
ables t(k), f(k), and q(k) (k = 0, . . . , N−1). Upon comparing the KKT conditions
of the above problem with those of the multi-period economic dispatch problem
(2.5)-(2.7), it is straightforward to verify that a (non-unique) optimal solution to
problem (A.1)-(A.3) is given by
t(k) = v(k) + u(k), f(k) = 0, and q(k) = 0
for all k. This optimal solution yields a collection of transmission rights with an
associated rent of Φ(T ,F) = −∑N−1k=0 λ(k)>(v(k) + u(k)). This equals the TCS
at the efficient market equilibrium, thus completing the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 2.3.16
Let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium throughout. Clearly, the max-
imum rent achievable by any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission and
storage rights is given by the optimal value of
maximize Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) (A.4)
subject to t(k)− s(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (A.5)
qi ∈ U(bi − ei), i = 1, . . . , n. (A.6)
This is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints in the decision vari-
ables t(k), f(k), q(k), s(k) (k = 0, . . . , N − 1), and ei (i = 1, . . . , n). Upon
comparing the KKT conditions of the above problem with those of the multi-
period economic dispatch problem (2.5)-(2.7), it is straightforward to verify that
a (non-unique) optimal solution to problem (A.4)-(A.6) is given by
t(k) = v(k) + u(k), f(k) = 0, q(k) = u(k), s(k) = u(k), and ei = 0
for all k and i. This optimal solution yields a collection of transmission and storage
rights with an associated rent of Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) = −∑N−1k=0 λ(k)>v(k). This
equals the MS at the efficient market equilibrium, thus completing the proof. 
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
Solving rs(T ) = F in (4.6) for A and substituting in the objective cs(T ) yields the
expression
sw(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] .
Differentiating the objective sw(T ) over pi yields
∇pisw(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[∇piDi(pi, ωi) (∇qSi(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ)]
= E [∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ)] (B.1)
where the second equality follows from Prop. 4 below. Now, the assumption
that each ∇piDi(pi, ωi) is negative definite implies that E[∇piD(pi, ω)] is invertible.
Hence, one can rewrite the necessary first-order condition (FOC), which is obtained
from equating ∇pisw(T ) = 0, as (4.7). Given the expression (4.7) for pi∗, (4.8) can
be obtained by solving the equality constraint rs(T ∗) = F for A∗. Lastly, these
FOC are sufficient for the optimality of (A∗, pi∗) since sw(T ) = cs(T ) + rs(T ) is
strictly concave in pi according to Prop. 6. 
Proposition 3 For each k = 1, . . . , N , Di(·, ·) satisfies
E
[
∂Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)/∂qik
∣∣ ωi1, . . . , ωik] = pik (B.2)
where the conditional expectation is taken over ωi conditioned on ωi1, . . . , ω
i
k.
Proof. (B.2) are FOCs of customer i’s multi-stage decision problem (4.1) of se-
quentially choosing qi1, . . . , q
i
k, . . . , q
i
N contingent on the so-far observed local states
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ωi1, . . . , ω
i
k to maximize his expected net utility or surplus, i.e.,
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))] (B.3)
given a tariff T (qi) = A + pi>qi known in advance (ex-ante). Hence, the optimal
solution qi(·) = Di(pi, ·) of (B.3) must satisfy these necessary optimality conditions.
Each of these stationarity (KKT) FOCs is obtained by differentiating the ob-
jective in (B.3) with respect to qik and equating the result to zero. To see that,
note that for each time k = 1, . . . , N one can use the law of total expectation to
rewrite the objective in terms of an expectation conditioned on the information
observed up to k, i.e.,
Eωi1,...,ωik
[
E
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωik]] .
The FOC in (B.2) follows since ∂T (qi(ωi))/∂qik = pik. 
Proposition 4 Di(·, ·) satisfies the equation
∂E[Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)]/∂pi = E
[∇piDi(pi, ωi)] pi (B.4)
where the expectations are taken over ωi.
Proof. We establish this vectorial identity proving each component separately.
Assuming the differentiation and expectation operators can be exchanged, we apply
the chain rule to the k-th component of the left-hand-side of (B.4) yielding the
following sequence of equalities
∂E[Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)]
∂pik
= E
[
N∑
t=1
∂Si
∂qit
· ∂D
i
t
∂pik
]
=
N∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
∂Si
∂qit
· ∂D
i
t
∂pik
∣∣∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωit]]
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=
N∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
∂Si
∂qit
∣∣∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωit] ∂Dit∂pik
]
= pi>E
[
∂Di
∂pik
]
,
where the second equality follows from the law of total expectation, the third
equality is due to the causality of Di(pi, ωi), and the last equality is due to Prop.
3. The identity (B.4) readily follows.
Proposition 5 For any affine tariff T (q) = A+ pi>q, cs(T ) is strictly convex and
(componentwise) decreasing in pi.
Proof. Differentiating cs(T ) with respect to pi (using the chain rule) and lever-
aging on the expression (B.4) from Prop. 4 one readily obtains ∇pics(T ) =
−E[D(pi, ω)]. Because Di(pi, ωi) is nonnegative, the expression above implies that
cs(T ) is componentwise decreasing pi. Moreover, we have that
∇2pics(T ) = −E[∇piD(pi, ω)]. (B.5)
Recall that a function is strictly convex (over a convex domain) if its Hessian is
positive definite (over said domain). Hence, the strict convexity of cs(T ) in pi
readily follows from the assumed negative definiteness of each matrix ∇piDi(pi, ω).

Proposition 6 Consider an affine tariff T (q) = A + pi>q. If Assumption 2 holds
then rs(T ) and the weighted surplus cs(T ) + γrs(T ) are strictly concave in pi for
any γ ≥ 1.
Proof. First, we differentiate twice rs(T ) with respect to pi. Using Prop. 4 and
some algebra one obtains the Hessian
∇2pirs(T ) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)] +∇g(pi). (B.6)
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Recall that a function is strictly concave (over a convex domain) if its Hessian is
negative definite (over said domain). Hence, the assumed negative definiteness of
∇piDi(pi, ω) and of ∇g(pi) (Assumption 2) readily imply the negative definiteness
of ∇2pirs(T ) and thus the strict concavity of rs(T ) in pi.
It remains to show that ∇2pi(cs(T )+γrs(T )) is negative definite for γ ≥ 1. From
(B.5) and (B.6) we have that
∇2pi(cs(T ) + γrs(T )) = (γ − 1)E[∇piD(pi, ω)] + γ∇g(pi).
Similar arguments yield the desired result since both terms on the right hand side
are negative definite for γ ≥ 1. 
Proof of Corollary 4.3.2
If ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated, then clearly E[∇piD(pi, ω)λ] =
E[∇piD(pi, ω)]λ. It follows that the expression for pi∗ in (4.7) reduces to pi∗ =
λ. In turn, the expression for φ(pi∗) in (4.8) reduces to φ(pi∗) = φ(λ) =
−Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω))), thus readily simplifying (4.8) to
A∗ = 1
M
(
F + Tr
(
Cov
(
λ,D
(
λ, ω
))))
. 
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Proof of Corollary 4.3.4
Leveraging on (4.2) and (4.4), the expected total surplus induced by the tariff T ∗
characterized in Thm. 4.3.1 can be written as
sw∗ = sw(T ∗)
= cs(T ∗) + rs(T ∗)
=
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)] .
Clearly, sw(T ) is a function of pi but not of F or A. It remains to show that pi∗ does
not depend on F . But the FOC characterizing pi∗ is obtained by differentiating
sw(T ) with respect to pi and equating it to zero. It follows that sw∗ does not on
F . Moreover, since rs(T ∗) = F must hold at optimality, it readily follows that
cs(T ∗) = sw(T ∗)− rs(T ∗) = sw∗ − F. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3
Consider the Lagrangian of problem (4.6)
L(pi, γ) = cs(T ) + γ(rs(T )− F ), (B.7)
where γ ∈ R is the multiplier of the equality constraint. Differentiating L(pi, γ)
over pi yields
∇piL = ∇pics(T ) + γ∇pirs(T )
= E[γ∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ) + (γ − 1)D(pi, ω)], (B.8)
where we use Prop. 4 to obtain the second equality. The necessary FOC in (4.11)
follows from equating (B.8) to zero after some algebra. These operations use the
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negative definiteness and thus invertibility of the matrix E[∇piD(pi, ω)] and the
expression for pi∗ in (4.7) (Thm. 4.3.1).
The expressions in (4.12) characterizing pi† componentwise can be obtained
from (4.11) after some algebraic manipulations using the definition of price elas-
ticity in (4.10). In particular, subtracting pi∗ from both sides of (4.11) and left-
multiplying by E[∇piD(pi†, ω)] one obtains
E[∇piD(pi†, ω)](pi† − pi∗) = −γ−1γ E[D(pi†, ω)].
Componentwise, for each k = 1, . . . , N , we have
E[∇piDk(pi†, ω)]>(pi† − pi∗) = −γ−1γ E[Dk(pi†, ω)]∑N
t=1 E[∂Dk(pi†, ω)/∂pit](pi
†
t − pi∗t )
E[Dk(pi†, ω)]
= −γ − 1
γ
N∑
t=1
−εkt(pi†)
(
pi†t − pi∗t
pi†t
)
=
γ − 1
γ
.
As for the last statement of the theorem, consider that maximizing rs(T ) (or
equivalently φ(pi)) over pi yields the related stationarity FOC
pim = pi∗ − E[∇piD(pim, ω)]−1E[D(pim, ω)]. (B.9)
This condition, which is similar to (4.11), characterizes the unregulated monopoly
price pim. Indeed, (B.9) can be obtained from (4.11) by replacing γ−1
γ
by 1, or
equivalently, by letting γ →∞ on both sides of (4.11).
Now, because pim maximizes φ(pi) and rs(T ) over pi ≥ 0, there does not exist
pi ≥ 0 such that rs(T ) > φ(pim). Hence, when restricted to linear tariffs, problem
(4.6) is infeasible for all F > φ(pim). For all the other values of F within the
considered regime, i.e., F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)], the fact that pi∗ and pim achieve φ(pi∗)
and φ(pim), respectively, and the concavity of rs(T ) (Prop. 6) imply the feasibility
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of problem (4.6) over said interval of F . Concluding, in the regime F ≥ φ(pi∗),
problem (4.6) over linear tariffs is feasible if F ≤ φ(pim) and unfeasible otherwise.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.5
At optimality, we have that rs(T †) = F and thus drs(T †)/dF = 1. The envelope
theorem further implies that the derivative of the value function cs(T †) of prob-
lem (4.6) with respect to the parameter F can be computed as dcs(T †)/dF =
∂L(pi†, γ)/∂F = −γ. The total derivative of the expected total surplus with re-
spect to F is then dsw(T †)/dF = 1−γ. Hence, to show that cs(T †) and sw(T †) are
decreasing and concave functions of F over F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)], it suffices to show
that γ, as a function of F , satisfies γ ≥ 1 and dγ/dF ≥ 0 over F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)].
Moreover, it is clear from the Lagreangian L(pi, γ) in (B.7) that rs(T †) must
be a decreasing function of the parameter γ. Conversely, the constraint rs(T ) = F
implies that rs(T †) is a strictly increasing function of F . Hence, we have that γ
increases as F increases, and thus dγ/dF ≥ 0.
Finally, note that γ = 1 and pi† = pi∗ are optimal for F = φ(pi∗) since they
satisfy the FOC (4.11) and the constraint rs(T †) = F . Recall also from Thm. 4.3.3
that the problem at hand remains feasible if F ≤ φ(pim). Because dγ/dF ≥ 0, we
can conclude that γ ≥ 1 for F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(pim)], thus completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.6
We prove this result by showing that the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ characterized
by Theorem 4.3.1 attains an upper bound for the performance of all ex-ante tariffs.
This upper bound is the performance achieved by a social planner who directly
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makes all decisions on behalf of consumers. The social planner is unlike the reg-
ulator who is limited to coordinate such decisions indirectly through a tariff. To
obtain a tight upper bound for ex-ante tariffs only (rather than a looser bound for
all possibly ex-post tariffs), the social planner makes customers’ decisions relying
only on the information observable by each of them (i.e., ωi) as opposed to based
on global information (e.g., ξ = (λ, ω1, . . . , ωM)).
Consider the social planner’s problem in (4.17), which corresponds to the reg-
ulator’s problem (4.6) in the absence of any DERs. Therein, the notation qi(ωi)
indicates the restriction of the social planner to make (causal) decisions contingent
only on the local state of each customer ωi. Recall from (4.1) that the expected
consumer surplus for a given ex-ante tariff is given by cs(T ) =
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T ), where
csi(T ) = max
qi(·)
E
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))]
= E
[
Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))] ,
and the corresponding expected retailer surplus is given by
rs(T ) = E
[
M∑
i=1
T
(
qi(T, ωi)
)− λ>qi(T, ωi)] ,
and the expected total surplus by
sw(T ) = cs(T ) + rs(T )
= E
[
M∑
i=1
Si
(
qi(T, ωi), ωi
)− λ>qi(T, ωi)] .
The following sequence of equalities/inequalities shows that problem (4.17) pro-
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vides an upper bound to problem (4.6).
max
T (·)
{cs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}+ F
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + F | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + rs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{sw(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
≤ max
T (·)
sw(T ) (B.10)
≤ max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
E
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
(B.11)
= max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
sw. (B.12)
In particular, the inequality in (B.11) holds because sw(T ) depends on T only
through qi(T, ωi). This implies that maximizing sw(T ) directly over {qi(·)}Mi=1
rather than indirectly over T (·) is a relaxation of the optimization in (B.10).
Clearly, the problem in (B.11) corresponds to the social planner’s problem in (B.12)
and (4.17).
It suffices to show now that T ∗ attains the upper bound in (B.12). To that
end, we use the independence sufficient condition ω ⊥ λ. We show that, under
said condition, the expected total surplus sw(T ∗) matches the upper bound. First
note that the condition ω ⊥ λ allows to rewrite the upper bound in (B.11) and
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(B.12) as follows.
max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
Eξ [sw]
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− E [λ>|ωi] qi(ωi)]
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
.
The last equality follows from the definition of the demand function Di(pi, ωi) in
(4.3) as the optimal response of customers to deterministic prices.
The result follows since the tariff T ∗ induces the same expected total surplus
if ω ⊥ λ, i.e.,
sw(T ∗) = Eξ
[ M∑
i=1
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
. 
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1
To solve the optimization problem (5.3) over affine tariffs of the form T (d) =
A + pi>d, we obtain expressions for cs(T ) and rs(T ) in terms of the parameters pi
and A, considering the customer-integrated DERs.
On one hand, from the separability implications of the linearity of T on the
customers’ problem established in Sec. 5.2.2, we have that customers with DERs
obtain an expected surplus
csi(T ) = E[Si(Di(pi, ωi))− T (di(pi, ωi))]
= csi0(T ) + E[pi>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))],
where csi0(T ), the expected consumer surplus without DERs, is computed according
to (5.1), i.e.,
csi0(T ) = E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− pi>Di(pi, ωi)]− A. (C.1)
On the other hand, since this case does not consider retailer-integrated DERs, the
retailer derives an expected surplus
rs(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E[T (di(pi, ωi))− λ>di(pi, ωi)]
= rs0(T )−
M∑
i=1
E[(pi − λ)>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))]
where rs0(T ), the expected retailer surplus without DERs, is computed according
to (5.2), i.e.,
rs0(T ) = A ·M +
M∑
i=1
E
[
(pi − λ)>Di(pi, ωi)] .
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We can now solve the constraint rs(T ) = F for A,
A = 1
M
(
F − E
[∑M
i=1(pi − λ)>di(pi, ωi)
])
(C.2)
and replace it in the objective function of problem (5.3), cs(T ), which yields
cs(T ) = sw0(T )− F +
M∑
i=1
E[λ>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))] (C.3)
where sw0(T ) = cs0(T ) + rs0(T ), the expected total surplus that T would induce
in the absence of DERs, is given by
sw0(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] . (C.4)
One can then show that sw0(T ) is maximized over pi at pidec = λ (see proof of
Theorem 1 in [87]), when ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated (see Cor. 1 in [87]).
Moreover, each term E[λ>s∗(pi, θi)] is also maximized over pi at pidec = λ since
E[λ>s∗(pi, θi)] = λ>s∗(pi, θi) ≤ λ>s∗(λ, θi) = V (λ, θi)
for all pi ∈ RN . Consequently, the expression cs(T ) in (C.3) is maximized over pi
at pi∗dec = λ. The strict concavity of sw0(T ) in pi (Prop. 4 in [87]) guarantees the
uniqueness and optimality of pi∗dec and A
∗
dec. Replacing pi and d
i(pi, ωi) in (C.2) for
λ and di(λ, ωi) according to (5.6), respectively, yields the expression for A∗dec in
(5.7), where
A∗ = 1
M
(
F + Tr
(
Cov
(
λ,D
(
λ, ω
))))
is the optimal connection charge without DERs for uncorrelated ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ
(Corollary 1 in [87]). 
Proof of Corollary 5.2.2
Theorem 5.2.1 implies that if ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated then pi∗dec = λ,
which does not depend on the parameter F . Hence, it is clear from (C.4) that
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sw∗0 ≡ sw0(T ∗), where T ∗(q) = A∗ + pi∗>q, is also independent from the parameter
F . It follows from (C.3) that
cs(T ∗dec) = sw
∗
0 − F +
∑M
i=1V (λ, θ
i) + E[λ>ri(ωi)]
and, since rs(T ∗dec) = F at optimality,
sw(T ∗dec) = sw
∗
0 +
∑M
i=1V (λ, θ
i) + E[λ>ri(ωi)].
Thus, sw(T ∗dec) is also independent of the parameter F . 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.3
We show this result using arguments analogous to those in the proof of Theorem
3 in [87]. That is, we show that the optimal two-part tariff T ∗dec attains an upper
bound for the performance of all ex-ante tariffs derived from the social planner’s
problem. To obtain a tight upper bound for ex-ante tariffs only (rather than a
looser bound for all possibly ex-post tariffs), the social planner makes customers’
decisions relying only on the information observable by each of them (i.e., ωi) as
opposed to based on global information (e.g., ξ = (λ, ω1, . . . , ωM)).
Consider the social planner’s problem
max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
sw (C.5a)
s.t si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M. (C.5b)
with
sw = Eξ
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>di(ωi)
]
which is related to the regulator’s problem (5.3) with customer-integrated DERs.
The notations qi(ωi), si(ωi), and di(ωi) indicate the restriction of the social planner
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to make (causal) decisions contingent only on the local state of each customer ωi.
Recall from (5.5) that the expected consumer surplus for a given ex-ante tariff is
given by cs(T ) =
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T ), where csi(T ) can be written as
csi(T ) = max
qi(·),si(·)
{
E
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T
(
qi(ωi)− ri(ωi)− si(ωi)
)] ∣∣∣si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
= E
[
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− T
(
qi∗(T, ωi)− ri(ωi)− si∗(T, ωi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
di∗(T,ωi)
)]
, (C.6)
and note that the corresponding expected retailer surplus is given by
rs(T ) = E
[
M∑
i=1
T (di∗(T, ωi))− λ>di∗(T, ωi)
]
,
and the expected total surplus by
sw(T ) = E
[ M∑
i=1
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− λ>di∗(T, ωi)
]
= E
[ M∑
i=1
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− λ>qi∗(T, ωi)
]
+ E
[ M∑
i=1
λ>(ri(ωi) + si∗(T, ωi))
]
.
The following sequence of equalities/inequalities shows that problem (C.5) pro-
vides an upper bound to problem (5.3).
max
T (·)
{cs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}+ F
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + rs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{sw(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
≤ max
T (·)
sw(T ) (C.7)
≤ max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
E
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
+
M∑
i=1
max
si(·)
{
E
[
λ>(ri(ωi) + si(ωi))
] ∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)} (C.8)
= max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
{
sw
∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M}. (C.9)
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In particular, the inequality in (C.8) holds because sw(T ) depends on T only
through qi∗(T, ωi) and si∗(T, ωi). This implies that maximizing sw(T ) directly over
{qi(·), si(·)}Mi=1 rather than indirectly over T (·) is a relaxation of the optimization
in (C.7). Clearly, the problem in (C.8) corresponds to the social planner’s problem
in (C.9) and (C.5).
It suffices to show now that T ∗dec attains the upper bound in (C.9). To that
end, we use the independence sufficient condition ω ⊥ λ. We show that, under
said condition, the expected total surplus sw(T ∗dec) matches the upper bound. First
note that the condition ω ⊥ λ allows to rewrite the upper bound in (C.8) and (C.9)
as follows.
max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
{
sw
∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M}
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− Eλ|ωi
[
λ|ωi]> qi(ωi)]
+ Eξ
[
λ>ri(ωi)
]
+ max
si(·)
{
Eξ
[
λ>si(ωi)
] ∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
+ λ
>
ri
+ max
si(·)
{
λ
>
si
∣∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
+ λ
>
ri + λ
>
s∗(λ, θi),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the demand function Di(pi, ωi)
and the simplification of storage operation policy under deterministic prices.
The result follows since the tariff T ∗dec induces the same expected total surplus
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if ω ⊥ λ, i.e.,
sw(T ∗dec) = Eξ
[ M∑
i=1
Si(Di(pi∗dec, ω
i), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗dec, ωi)
]
+ E
[ M∑
i=1
λ>(ri(ωi) + s∗(pi∗dec, θ
i))
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
+ λ
>
(ri + s∗(λ, θi)). 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.4
To solve problem (5.3) over affine tariffs of the form T (d) = A + pi>d, we first
need expressions for cs(T ) and rs(T ) in terms of (pi,A), considering the retailer-
integrated DERs.
On the one hand, since this case does not consider customer-integrated DERs,
the customers derive an expected surplus that remains unchanged, i.e., csi(T ) =
csi0(T ). On the other hand, (5.9) characterizes the expected retailer surplus induced
by T considering the retailer-integrated DERs.
According to (5.9), rs(T ) depends on the decision variables (pi,A) only through
rs0(T ). Hence, the regulator’s problem (5.3) at hand, with parameter F , is
equivalent to that of the regulator without any DERs and parameter F˜ :=
F − V (λ, θo)− E[λ>ro(ξ)], i.e.,
max
T (·)
cs0(T ) s.t. rs0(T ) = F˜ . (C.10)
Theorem 1 in [87] for the case without DERs characterizes the optimal two-part
tariff for problem (C.10). Applying this result to problem (C.10) yields the desired
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result, i.e.,
pi∗cen = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗cen, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗cen, ω)(λ− λ)]
and
A∗cen =
1
M
(
F˜ − E [(pi∗cen − λ)>D(pi∗cen, ω)]
)
= 1
M
(F − E [(pi∗cen − λ)>D(pi∗cen, ω)])
− 1
M
(
V (λ, θo)− E[λ>ro(ξ)])
= A∗ − 1
M
(
V (λ, θo)− E[λ>ro(ξ)]) . 
Proof of Corollary 5.2.5
Applying Cor. 2 in [87] to problem (C.10) implies that
cs(T ∗cen) = sw
∗
0 − F˜
= sw∗0 − F + V (λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]
where, according to (5.8), sw∗0 ≡ sw0(T ∗) does not depend on F . The result follows
since rs(T ∗cen) = F further implies that
sw(T ∗cen) = cs(T
∗
cen) + rs(T
∗
cen)
= sw∗0 + V (λ, θ
o) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]. 
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